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ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to re-examine the relationship between corporate strategy and
business unit strategy. Past research has often failed to deconstruct the notion of corporate effects
to properly assess the role of corporate strategy in the behaviour and performance of business
units. As a result, conflicting findings have led to researchers disagreeing on the significance of
corporate effects and corporate strategy. Through this thesis, I have taken steps to clarify the
misunderstood significance of corporate strategy to business-unit-level strategy and
performance. This dissertation has drawn on the literature from agency theory, information
processing theory, and upper echelons theory, as well as the economic logic that underlies value
creation in corporations. Through this dissertation, I deconstruct the notion of corporate effects
to theoretically redefine the role of controls as the mediator between corporate strategy and
business unit strategy to respond to the research question, “How does corporate strategy
influence business unit performance?” In addition, I deconstruct business unit effects to examine
the impact of business strategy on business unit performance. Finally, I consider business unit
strategy to be an exogenous factor.
To explore the effect of corporate strategy on business-unit-level strategy and
performance, I conducted a quantitative analysis of data corresponding to over 2,500 business
units from 193 corporations. Building on a proprietary dataset made accessible for this research,
I tested the theoretical model for this thesis using previously collected data from each of the
studied business units and the corporate headquarters of their corporate parents. The dataset
comprises objective measures of business unit financial performance, objective characteristics of
corporate headquarters and structure, and more subjective and behavioural data based on surveys
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that focus on control mechanisms to which business units are subject and the strategic orientation
they pursue. The quantitative analysis was undertaken after performing steps for validation of the
measures used and in compliance with measures and techniques used in past research.
I find support in my analysis for a partial mediating role of controls in the relationship
between corporate strategy and business-unit-level strategy. The results from the analysis
demonstrate that the strategic orientations of business units are endogenous to the corporate
strategy through the mechanism of controls to which each business unit is subject. I also find
support for the moderating effect of certain factors at the corporate level, such as size of
corporate headquarters, number of business units managed by the corporation, and the corporate
CEO’s background in the relationship between corporate strategy and controls.
The findings of this thesis re-establish the role of corporate strategy in our understanding
of business-unit-level strategy and performance. Contrary to past research, I have theorized
business-unit-level strategy to be endogenous to corporate strategy. I have also developed the
controls construct and have measured it for each business unit studied in order to test my
theoretical model. My findings in this thesis take a step towards enhancing our understanding of
how corporate strategy influences strategy and performance at the business unit level.
Keywords: Corporate Strategy, Business Unit Strategy, Corporate Controls, Business Unit
Performance
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction
During the past two centuries, the world of business has witnessed a gradual change
where the domination of small and family-owned businesses has been replaced by corporations
with multiple businesses in different product markets. The corporations that have evolved follow
different logics that justify their operations in multiple businesses. This trend has become even
more dominant during the past century, and in some markets the majority of firms pursue
diversification of one kind or another (Rumelt, 1974). While the trend of diversification is more
evident in some geographical locations, it has gradually become a trend in most countries.
During the latter half of the 20th century, diversification as a strategy grew significantly
in the majority of industrialized countries (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). For instance, from 1950 to
1974, the percentage of U.S. firms on the Fortune 500 list that pursued diversification strategies
grew from 30.1% to 63% (Rumelt, 1974, 1982). Studying a sample of 44,288 U.S. firms between
1984 and 1997, Denis, Denis, and Yost (2002) reported an increase in the rate of diversification
of 29% to 45%. Firms that diversified achieved this objective through their own organic growth
or through mergers and acquisitions — a trend that became more dominant during the last
quarter of the past century (Porter, 1987). Despite the reversal trend of deconglomeration and
divestiture during the 1970s and 1980s (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Ravencraft and Scherer,
1987), diversification still remains the dominant logic among most large businesses in the
industrialized world (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002).
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The aforementioned trends in diversification have also resulted in significant changes to
the traditional ways in which businesses are managed. Unlike in the past, when a firm was
operating in a single product market, corporations are now facing issues that arise from multiple
product markets that have industry-specific idiosyncrasies. From an agency theory perspective,
complexities inherent in the separation of ownership and control have become even more
complicated as multiple layers of principals have emerged due to diversification at the corporate
level.
The main question in corporations has become, “How can the corporation ensure that its
business units operate in a manner that creates the highest value for the corporation and its
shareholders as a whole?” To respond to this question, researchers have conducted extensive
conceptual and empirical research, and corporations have designed and employed various
mechanisms to realize the economic expectations associated with the logic of pursuing a
corporate-level strategy of different levels of diversification.
Reviewing the literature that focuses on corporate strategy, I was intrigued to see whether
and how the issue of corporate strategy would be addressed in practical terms within
corporations. My main interest was drawn to instances where business units failed to deliver the
value that was expected by their corporate parents — a phenomenon that requires an examination
of the control mechanisms put in place by corporate headquarters.
While many of the institutions that face financial challenges are diversified, I found that
there was little attention placed on the issue of corporate controls and the corporate parent–
business unit relationship. There is very little research by scholars and practitioners that
addresses the issue of corporate controls within the context of corporate strategy from any
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dimension other than that of CEO compensation. Instead, most emphasis has been placed on
business unit CEOs and strategies pursued by business units. This has inspired me to conduct
research on the role that corporate controls play in the creation of value (i.e., exceeding the
aggregate performance of business units, if they operate independent from the corporation) in the
relationship between corporations and their business units.
Most past research focusing on the corporate parent–business unit relationship has
limited itself to the broad influence of corporate effects (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997) and
business unit effects. In reality, corporate effects include corporate strategy, corporate structure,
corporate controls and corporate rewards. What has not been considered in the research on
corporate effects is the possibility of countervailing, neutralizing, or negating effects among
strategy, structure, controls, and rewards at the corporate level. In addition, this research has used
business-unit-level effects without disaggregating at least the effect of business-unit-level
strategy. Moreover, little has been done to understand the relationship between strategy at the
corporate parent and business unit levels.
The aim of this dissertation is to unpack from the concept of corporate effects the impact
of corporate strategy and corporate controls; to unpack business unit strategy from the concept of
business effects; and to re-examine the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit
strategy and, ultimately, business unit performance. Therefore, this dissertation makes an attempt
to provide a more clear understanding of the antecedents of business unit performance. My
review of the existing literature has led me to conclude that the notion of corporate controls has
largely been understudied in the performance of business units. The objective of this dissertation
is to re-establish the relationship between corporate strategy and business strategy through
theorizing the role of corporate controls as a mediating factor. In doing so, this dissertation
3

challenges business-unit-level strategy as an exogenous variable and emphasizes the influence of
corporate strategy on the performance of business units in diversified firms. Consequently, this
dissertation challenges conclusions drawn from previous empirical findings on the basis of their
ambiguity in defining corporate effects and their theoretical representation of business unit
effects in the presence of a corporate parent.

1.2 Overview
The influences of corporate-level factors or corporate effects on the performance of
business units and corporations have generated much interest among researchers during the past
several decades. However, much of past literature has fallen short of deconstructing corporate
effects and understanding their constituent parts and roles. This has led research findings to
examine the relationship between corporate effects and various business unit levels and
corporate-level factors.
In this dissertation, I aim to take a step towards the deconstruction of corporate effects
and business unit effects. The broad definitions that exist for corporate effects often omit that
different constituents of corporate effects may counter one another and that their misalignment
may have an attenuating influence on the measurement of corporate effects. As a result, findings
based on corporate effects may lead to misinterpretations based on small observed effects.
Therefore, I make the attempt to avoid such misinterpretations and focus on corporate strategy
and corporate controls as two constituents of the corporate effects variable.
My review of past literature on corporate strategy points to yet another shortcoming.
Similar to corporate-level analysis, business-level analysis suffers from undermining the role of
4

business unit strategy and instead focusing on business or segment effects when comparing
corporate-level and business-unit-level influences on the performance of business units (e.g.,
McGahan and Porter 1997). Consequently, a solid understanding of the influence of business
unit strategy compared to corporate strategy on business unit performance still remains out of
reach. In this dissertation, I build on the existing literature to distinguish business unit strategy as
a constituent of business effects and to measure its influence on business unit performance.
Corporate strategy has been considered an important research topic in the area of
strategic management, and its relationship to performance has been a focus of interest for
academics and practitioners alike (Palepu, 1985). When focusing on corporate strategy, most
researchers have tended to show a higher degree of interest in corporate diversification. Much of
this interest has been generated as the result of the observation that many American businesses
have engaged in multiple lines of business (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Ravencraft and
Scherer, 1987). Some researchers have found the tendency of organizations to engage in multiple
lines of business to have interesting practical and theoretical implications (Michel and Hambrick,
1992). The interest in corporate strategy and corporate effects has resulted in many researchers
investigating the influence of corporate effects and corporate strategy on the performance of
single business units as well as corporations’ overall performance. However, the findings of past
research in this area have generally demonstrated conflicting results. The range of propositions
and findings from previous research includes corporate effects being a significant determinant of
performance in business units (Rumelt, 1974; Bowman and Helfat, 2001), and corporate effects
having little to no significant influence at all (Rumelt, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997). As a
result of these findings, corporate influences on the performance of business units remains a
controversial area for research and one in which very little consensus among researchers exists.
5

Past research has mentioned methodological differences as the significant contributing
factor to the existing differences in findings that have related corporate strategy and/or corporate
effects to business unit performance (Bowman and Helfat, 2003). Also, little has been done to
provide a better understanding of the differences that exist between business unit performance
and overall corporate performance, either theoretically or in practice. This has resulted in
differences in the conceptual perception of performance in strategic management research.
Another shortcoming in past research on corporate effects/strategy has been a lack of
depth in studying the mechanism through which corporate effects/strategy gets translated into
performance — either corporate performance or business unit performance. Most research that
has investigated the relationship between corporate-level factors and performance (e.g., Gort,
1962; Arnould, 1969; Rumelt, 1974, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1999) has done little to
unpack corporate strategy from corporate effects and to investigate the link between corporate
strategy and business-level strategy. Instead, much attention has been focused on how corporatelevel effects lead to business-level or corporate-level performance. As a result, corporate strategy
has remained overlooked and, when referred to, business-level strategy and corporate-level
strategy has been implicitly assumed as mutually independent, with business-level effects and
strategy treated as an exogenous variable.
Research analyzing studies using variance decomposition techniques (Bowman and
Helfat, 2001) has also fallen short of explaining the antecedents of performance when corporate
effects exist. In addition, and more importantly, research has fallen short of unpacking corporate
effects, leading to a theoretical omission of the causal relationship between corporate strategy
and business-level strategy (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1982). Consequently,
while past findings have attempted to understand the significance of the role of corporate effects
6

in business unit and corporate-level performance, the effect of corporate strategy on business unit
performance still remains underappreciated.
Drawing on literature from agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the upper
echelons perspective (Michel and Hambrick, 1994), and the notion of information processing
capacity (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990), this dissertation aims to unpack what has been previously
studied as corporate effects and shed new light on the link between corporate strategy and the
performance of business units. In particular, this dissertation attempts to provide an answer to the
following research question, “How does corporate strategy influence business unit
performance?” In doing so, a reassessment of the relationship between corporate strategy and
business strategy is undertaken. An important contribution of this dissertation is to unpack what
is commonly referred to as “corporate effects” and emphasize the role of controls from corporate
headquarters on strategic orientation at the business unit level. The findings of this dissertation
address the constraints that are associated with corporate strategy and how such constraints
influence corporate controls that are exercised and, subsequently, the strategic direction of the
business units of corporations. Afterwards, this dissertation proceeds with the link between
business-level strategy and each business unit’s subsequent performance, establishing the
indirect effect of corporate strategy on business unit performance. The theoretical model that has
been proposed in this dissertation and which is tested empirically is illustrated in Figure 1.1. This
model will be briefly explained in the remaining sections of this chapter.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic Representation of the Proposed
roposed Theoretical Model

1.3 Level of Analysis
Much of the literature in the area of corporate effects/strategy
strategy has focused on whether
corporate effects influence business performance (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991; McGahan and
Porter, 1997; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Therefore, much of past
research applies a multilevel approach when conducting the analysis. The main reason for
applying a multilevel approach is ofte
often
n based on considering business effects to be partly nested
within the effects at the corporate level, without proper deconstruction of the effects (Hough,
2006; Misangyi, Elms, Greckhamer, and Lepine, 2006)
2006).. Therefore, to decompose the variance,
multilevell analysis has been used. However, this dissertation has taken a different approach in
that it is based onn its conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy and
business unit strategy.
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There are three dependent variables of interest that are included in this dissertation:
corporate controls, business-level strategy, and business-level performance. All of the dependent
variables of this dissertation are analyzed at the business level. The independent variable of this
dissertation — corporate strategy — is measured at the level of the corporation and is also used
for analysis of its effect at the business level. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies, this study
focuses its level of analysis at two levels: the corporate level and the business level. Corporate
strategy and three moderator variables are measured at the corporate level, while corporate
controls are measured for each business unit and based on the responses of managers at each
business unit. Business unit performance and business unit strategy are also measured at the
business unit level.

1.4 Corporate Strategy
The independent and exogenous variable of interest in this study is corporate strategy.
The main objective of the research being proposed is to establish the relationship between
corporate strategy and the strategic orientation and performance of business units. The concept of
corporate strategy as a construct and the variables that represent it in the theoretical model are
introduced in Chapter 2.
In Chapter 2, the literature on corporate diversification and its theoretical underpinnings
is reviewed extensively and the contrasts between various theoretical perspectives are illustrated.
This review contains the trends in diversification among firms and within the literature of
strategy and the incentives and motives that exist for firms to diversify. Then, the literature on
related and unrelated diversification as two of the major categories of corporate strategy is
9

reviewed. Chapter 2 concludes with reviewing the literature that has focused on the relationship
between diversification and performance.

1.5 Corporate Controls
The corporate headquarters is responsible for ensuring that performance of individual
business units aggregates to the highest overall performance for the corporation and that
decisions and actions at the business unit level are aligned with the best interests of the
corporation. Therefore, the design and implementation of controls on business units to achieve
this objective also forms an important responsibility for corporate headquarters. Corporations
design control mechanisms to ensure that the strategic direction and operational output of
business units is in line with those of the corporation’s objectives and that expected synergies, if
any, are realized.
In Chapter 3, I focus on controls as one of the main constructs of interest in this
dissertation. First, I conduct a review of the different types of controls that can be employed by
corporations. In line with past research (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990, 1994), controls are
distinguished on the basis of their reliance on accounting measures and/or subjective criteria.
Building on theoretical conceptualizations in past research and on the literature that makes the
distinction between the nature of expected generated values in related and unrelated
diversification, and considering resource constraints, it is argued that related diversified firms
and unrelated diversified firms differ in how they control their business units; related diversified
corporations are expected to rely on both strategic controls and financial controls with more of
an emphasis on strategic, while unrelated diversified corporations are expected to put stronger
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emphasis on implementing financial controls as their primary control mechanism. Although
similarities with past research exist on these propositions, and the conceptualization of controls
as endogenous to corporate strategy is not entirely new, factors that moderate the relationship
between corporate strategy and controls have either not been included explicitly, or have been
neglected entirely in past research. Three of these factors that are related to the ability of
corporate headquarters to process information are size of headquarters, relative experience of the
corporate CEO, and the number of business units controlled by the corporation (Hoskisson, Hitt,
and Hill, 1991; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993).

1.5.1 Size of Headquarters
Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses on the controls of corporations and their
relationship to the strategic direction that is taken at the corporate level. In order for corporations
to effectively monitor the actions and performances of their business units, the corporate
headquarters should possess effective monitoring capabilities. However, when the number of
staff at corporate headquarters is limited, the ability of a corporation to allocate the appropriate
amount of time and attention to each business unit will diminish. Consequently, corporate
headquarters will resort to less time-consuming and less demanding mechanisms, which will in
turn influence the type of controls that can be implemented (Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993).
Thus, in the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls, the moderating role
of the size (i.e., number of staff) of corporate headquarters has been included in the theoretical
model that is proposed. Past research has mostly focused on the size of the board of directors,
theorizing the role of board size on the ability of the board to be vigilant (Kroll, Walters, and
Wright, 2008). Since the responsibility to process information relevant to business units resides
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significantly with the staff of the corporate headquarters and not with the board of directors, this
dissertation takes a different approach from past studies and uses the size of staff at corporate
headquarters. By doing so, this dissertation accounts for the effect of the size of the corporate
headquarters on its ability to remain vigilant as the moderator of the relationship between
corporate strategy with the controls that are put in place for each business unit. This is more
appropriate than the size of the board, because the responsibility of monitoring business units
and processing information relevant to their operations rests mainly with the corporate staff, not
with the board of directors.

1.5.2 Relative Experience of the Corporate CEO
In a corporation, the ultimate responsibility for decision-making rests with the
corporation’s top management and, above all, its CEO (Adner and Helfat, 2003). The upper
echelons perspective emphasizes the role of the CEO’s cognitive capacity in delivering
organizational outcomes (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). The ability of the corporate CEO to be
effective in evaluating the quality of decisions and actions of business units and to make
appropriate decisions regarding these decisions and actions rests with his or her level of
knowledge and expertise with respect to each business unit and the industry in which the
business unit operates. Without necessary expertise and/or knowledge, the corporate CEO will be
forced to make his/her evaluations and decisions on the basis of quantitative factors such as
accounting and financial indicators (Kroll, Walters, and Wright, 2008) without regard for
subjective, qualitative indicators. Therefore, the ability of corporations to control their business
units will depend on the level of expertise of the corporate CEO relative to each business unit. In
this dissertation, the relative expertise of the corporate CEO has been theorized as a moderating
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variable. The moderating role of the corporate CEO’s experience is discussed in detail in Chapter
3.

1.5.3 Number of Business Units and Headquarters’ Effectiveness
Besides differences in the size of the corporate headquarters and CEO expertise, there is
another factor that influences the ability of managers to effectively monitor and control all the
operations within business units. The greater the number of business units, the more time and
information processing capacity is required at the corporate level in order to effectively control
them. Therefore, given the level of information processing capacity that has been developed
within corporate headquarters, a larger number of business units means that less attention can be
dedicated to monitor each individual business unit (Hoskisson, Hitt, and Hill, 1991). The
moderating role of the number of business units on the relationship between corporate strategy
and corporate controls is discussed in Chapter 3.

1.6 Business Unit Strategy
Chapter 4 of this dissertation investigates the relationship between strategies that are
pursued by business units and the controls that are put in place by their corporate parent. Prior
research has mostly used business unit effects and considered business strategy to be an
exogenous variable (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997) and independent from either corporate
effects or corporate strategy. Therefore, little has been done to understand how controls influence
the strategy that is pursued by business units. This dissertation draws on agency theory to
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propose that the type of controls that are designed and implemented by corporations has a
significant role in determining the strategies that business units pursue.
In Chapter 4, different categorizations of business strategy and their relationship to
exploration and exploitation are discussed. Then, drawing on agency theory, it is argued that
business unit executives conform to the corporate controls that they are subject to and pursue
strategies that align with these corporate control systems.

1.7 Performance
The objective of economic enterprise is to create economic value for its principals. Firms
that yield the highest economic value in the short term and long term are considered to be those
with the highest performance. Therefore, performance has become a very important construct in
the literature of strategic management. There is extensive literature in the area of strategic
management that has established the relationship between corporate effects and business unit
performance (e.g., Bowman and Helfat, 2001) or business unit strategy and business unit
performance (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007). These findings have often used either financial
indicators or, sometimes, composite measures that entail different dimensions of business unit
performance. In this dissertation, each dimension of performance is utilized as a unique
construct. Chapter 5, which focuses on performance, examines the existing literature on
performance and mainly focuses on two dimensions: financial performance and growth in market
share. Then, it draws from literature on “fit” (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986) to introduce
the importance of fit between controls and business-unit-level strategy to achieve desirable
performance at the business unit level.
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1.7.1 Financial Performance
Financial performance is considered to be the simplest of performance measures that are
employed by researchers and practitioners in evaluating whether a business unit is achieving its
desirable objectives. In Chapter 5, a review of the validity and types of measurements of
financial performance is provided.

1.7.2 Growth in Market Share
Unlike financial measures as the only way to measure financial performance, there are a
variety of methods that have been used to measure market performance. Understanding and
assessing market performance often uses both subjective and objective criteria, which requires
greater depth on the part of corporate directors. Market performance has also been found to be
associated with strategic directions that are not necessarily associated with short-term financial
performance. Growth in market share represents one dimension of market performance in past
research. This research has used growth in sales of a business unit as a proxy to measure its
growth in market share (e.g., White, 1986), and this dissertation takes a similar approach.
Chapter 5 of this dissertation discusses the variety of market performance measures that have
been adopted in past research and examines the relationship between growth in market share and
the strategy that is pursued by business units.

1.7.3 Fit Between Business Strategy and Controls
In order for business strategy to be successfully executed and to yield desirable
subsequent performance, there is the need for a “fit” to exist between different organizational
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factors (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986). As such, business units that have a better fit
between their strategic direction and the requirements inherent within the corporate controls that
they consider they are subject to are expected to be more successful performers. Chapter 5 also
examines the concept of “fit” in past literature and argues for its extension to the interaction
between corporate controls and business-level strategy, and its subsequent interactive effect on
business units’ growth in sales and financial performance.

1.8 Methodology and Data
To test the hypotheses that are presented in this dissertation, existing methodological
approaches for the measurement of constructs have been used, and several steps have been taken
in proposing the development and implementation of methods for the measurement of certain
constructs. In Chapter 6, the variables corresponding to each construct and the measures that
operationalize those variables are discussed.
This dissertation relies on quantitative methods. For some variables, pre-existing
quantified and validated content analysis approaches are used (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007).
The required panel data for this dissertation was collected from data that has been archived by
the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO) from Iranian
corporations that either operate under IDRO’s umbrella or subscribe to its services and licenses.
IDRO, which operates as a government-owned industrial hub, has overseen the operations of all
Iranian industrial facilities since its inception in 1967. The data used for this dissertation includes
archived data on 193 corporations and their 2,704 business units between the years 1999 and
2004. The analysis of the data is conducted through the use of regression analysis.
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1.9 Summary
The early research on corporate diversification dates back five decades (e.g., Gort, 1962;
Arnould, 1969), but the significance of corporate strategy to the performance of business units
still remains an issue on which there is little consensus among researchers. Past research has
reported a wide range of conclusions for this relationship and debate still continues (e.g., Rumelt,
1974, 1982; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Some of these differences
have been attributed to the use of different measures, or underdeveloped methodological
approaches (Montgomery, 1982; Palepu, 1985). But for the most part, past research has failed to
unpack corporate effects and properly establish the relationship between corporate strategy and
business unit strategy and performance.
In this dissertation, the theoretical foundations of corporate strategy have been revisited.
In unpacking corporate effects, drawing from the literature on agency theory, and signifying the
bounded rationality resulting from information processing capacity, corporate controls are
emphasized as an important variable that has often been omitted in the existing theoretical
models. Accordingly, this dissertation provides several conceptual and methodological
contributions to the literature on corporate strategy.
First, the model in this dissertation represents corporate controls as a mediating variable
in the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. Second, it introduces
the business unit strategy of wholly owned business units as a factor that is endogenous to
controls, and not as the exogenous independent variable that has been assumed in past research
(e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001).
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The research also provides several methodological contributions. First, it introduces a
method for the transformation of the measure of diversification into a continuous variable that
entails both the dimension of related diversification and that of unrelated diversification. Second,
drawing on agency theory as the cornerstone for corporate controls, it employs a method for
measuring strategic controls with a stronger connection to theory. The method for measuring
financial controls that are more objective follows a similar approach to methods employed in
past research.
This research also has implications for practice. These implications provide corporations
with a better understanding of prerequisites to implement strategic and financial controls that
should exist within corporate headquarters. Furthermore, this dissertation emphasizes the need to
pay attention to the fit between corporate controls and their business unit factors.
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CHAPTER 2: CORPORATE STRATEGY

2.1 Introduction
The scope of diversification has been of interest to researchers in strategic management.
With the growth of organizations and the emergence of multiproduct firms, multilevel strategic
issues have also become prominent. During the latter half of the 20th century, the dominance of
businesses that operated within one single product market has evolved into the dominance of
larger businesses operating in multiple industries. Many of the former businesses experienced
institutional and environmental pressures as well as internal incentives to diversify their product
and service offerings from a single industry to multiple industries. Consequently, by the end of
the past century, the majority of U.S. firms and those in other industrialized nations were
involved in some kind of diversification (Rumelt, 1974; Berry, 1975; Chang and Choi, 1988;
Channon, 1973; Chenall, 1979; Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976;
Franko, 1974; McDougall and Round, 1984; Suzuki, 1980; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990); this trend
was even faster among top-performing firms (Rumelt, 1982).
With the emergence of diversified firms, the complexities in their management in order to
achieve higher performance became evident. The difference in economic logic for value creation
in diversified firms (Teece, 1980, 1982) required understanding strategy at the corporate level,
which was different from that at the business unit level. While earlier studies tended to neglect
the role of strategy at the corporate level, focusing on diversification per se (e.g., Gort, 1962;
Arnould, 1969), later studies focused on different diversification strategies and their influence on
performance at both the corporate level and the business unit level (Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991).
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Past literature in strategic management has made a distinction between corporate-level
and business-unit-level strategy (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). This distinction has often been
attributed to the focus of interest. While the primary focus in business unit strategy is to achieve
success among a group of competitors in a product market through the allocation of resources
and other strategic decisions (Barney, 2002; Dundas and Richardson, 1980), corporate strategy
deals with the questions of what, and how many, product markets a firm should be operating in
(Grant, 1995). It also deals with the following question: How does a firm manage the business
units operating in multiple product markets to achieve overall success (Dundas and Richardson,
1980)? Corporate strategy has been defined as actions that are taken by firms in order to achieve
competitive advantage through managing a diverse group of businesses that compete in different
industries and product markets (Grant, 1995; Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, Rowe, and Sheppard,
2006). Just as with the diversified firm’s business-level strategies, corporate strategy is expected
to help the firm earn above-average returns by creating value; the extra value created exceeds the
costs associated with having a corporate head office. In other words, corporate strategy can be
considered to be the choice between pursuing different types of growth through diversification
(Collis and Montgomery, 1998) to synergistically create more value than the combined value of
all business units if each business unit was a standalone business.
Past research at the corporate level of the firm has focused on diversification. This focus
was further sharpened when diversification became a major trend worldwide (Berry, 1975;
Chang and Choi, 1988; Channon, 1973; Chenall, 1979; Dyas and Thanheiser, 1976; Franko,
1974; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; McDougall and Round, 1984; Rumelt, 1974; Suzuki, 1980).
The interest in diversification among researchers became particularly strong in the 1970s and
1980s, when firms showed more interest in entering multiple product markets. For example,
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from the 1950s until the mid-1970s, the percentage of firms on the Fortune 500 list that pursued
some type of diversification strategy grew from 30.1% to 63% (Rumelt, 1974, 1982), a trend that
persisted as the past century came to an end (Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002). While the latter half
of the 1970s and most of the 1980s witnessed trends towards firms exiting from unrelated
product markets through divestiture (Hoskisson and Turk, 1990; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987;
Williams, Paez, and Sanders, 1988), most of the larger firms remained quite diversified
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
In this chapter, the aim is to introduce corporate strategy as a construct of interest within
the proposed theoretical model of this dissertation. To achieve this purpose, a review is
conducted of the existing literature on corporate effects, diversification, and the different
diversification corporate strategies that can be pursued by corporations. Furthermore, the
findings in past research that have investigated the relationship between corporate effects,
corporate strategy, and business unit performance are reviewed and the conflicting results are
discussed.

2.2 Diversification
Diversification is pursued by firms to increase performance through simultaneous
operation in multiple product or service markets. Research on firm diversification has been at the
heart of scholarly work focusing on the corporate level. Generally, diversification research has
fallen into one of two streams, industrial organization and strategic management; the latter
focuses mostly on the impact of diversification on profitability (Palepu, 1985). This interest in
diversification has resulted in extensive research being conducted on the link between
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diversification and performance at the business unit level and corporate level alike (e.g., Gort,
1962; Arnould, 1969, Markham, 1973; Rumelt, 1974, 1982, 1991; Berry, 1975; Christensen and
Montgomery, 1981; Bettis and Hall, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; Palepu, 1985; Schmalansee,
1985; Lubatkin, 1987; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Amit and Livant, 1988; Ramanujam
and Varadarajan, 1989; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998; Bowman and Helfat,
2001). Such research has focused on diversification, corporate effects, and corporate strategy to
understand their effect on business unit and corporate-level performance. As a result of the use of
different independent variables, the findings of such studies have resulted in conflicting results
ranging from showing a significant effect (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1982; Christensen and
Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1982; Bowman and Helfat, 2001) to showing a trivial or
insignificant effect (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969; Markham, 1973; Berry, 1975; Lubatkin,
1987; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998).
Unfortunately, corporate effects and corporate strategy have remained undistinguished in
research, and their inclusion within an integrated theoretical model has been overlooked.
Corporate effects include various dimensions that stem from the corporate level. Such
dimensions could include corporate controls, HR practices, corporate structure, management
preferences, and compensation and reward mechanisms, in addition to corporate strategy, which
is mainly concerned with how a corporation chooses to diversify. Most existing literature has
chosen to focus on corporate effects — as a broad construct — when investigating the
relationship between corporate-level and business-level factors in corporations. Consequently,
there is a need for research to deconstruct and unpack corporate effects in corporations in order
to better explain the link between corporate strategy and business unit performance.
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Corporate strategy involves the choice that firms make to pursue diversification into
related product markets or into product markets that are unrelated to one another. A main
distinguishing factor in the pursuit of different corporate strategies is the need for firms to
acquire new skills, techniques, and facilities (Ansoff, 1965). Without the necessary resources, the
economic feasibility of each type of corporate strategy is in doubt (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982;
Wernerfelt, 1984). Financial assets, either considered as tangible (Porter, 1985) or intangible
(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988), are considered by some researchers as an important resource
that facilitates diversification (Porter, 1985; Jensen, 1986; Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988).
The easy redeployment of financial assets provides a higher degree of flexibility in
diversifying into different product markets. When financial assets are not the main available
resource that a firm possesses, it is often excess capacity that drives diversification (Porter,
1985). Lower flexibility in mobility and redeployment of such resources as excess capacities
plays a constraining role in the ability of firms to diversify. Firms that rely on their physical and
non-financial assets for diversification are often more successful when diversifying into product
markets that have some degree of relatedness to their existing product markets, particularly in the
area of production technology (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).

2.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Diversification
Research on diversification is based on diverse theoretical underpinnings. Some of these
fundamental theoretical differences have resulted in differences in the conceptualization of the
topic and inferences that have been drawn from empirical findings. Research on diversification
mainly agrees that under conditions of perfect competition, firms are unlikely to pursue
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diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). When firms are assumed to exist within markets with
relatively homogeneous factor markets (Scherer, 1980), only very limited diversification can be
expected (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
Based on past literature on diversification, Hoskisson and Hitt (1990) have identified
three main theoretical perspectives that have influenced research in the area of corporate
strategy. The first perspective focuses on firms as single product entities, the second looks into
market imperfections and firm idiosyncrasies, and the third investigates the role of personal
incentives and interests in the choice of diversification.
The first approach assumes firms to be single-product firms operating in homogeneous
factor markets (Scherer, 1980). This approach, which is derived from neoclassical economic
assumptions and the structure–conduct–performance paradigm, considers firm performance to be
largely dependent on market actions rather than firm actions (Schmalansee, 1989). These
assumptions leave little incentive for diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). The limited role
that managers are assumed to have in the success or failure of firms is not much different from
the assumptions in population ecology (Bourgeois, 1984; Hitt and Tyler, 1989; Hoskisson and
Hitt, 1990). Also, based on assumptions in neoclassical economics where resource mobility is
not limited, firms are assumed to have unlimited access to resources they need, which leaves
little justification for diversification to acquire resources. Under such assumptions, leasing
resources is more in accordance with this perspective (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
A second perspective, which has been driven largely by the dominance of markets by
multi-product firms (Karnani and Wernerfelt, 1985), assumes that idiosyncrasies and
imperfections within markets and firms that cause firm heterogeneity (Barney, 1986). This
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approach also gives rise to the concept of fit from contingency theory (Venkatraman, 1989) and
emphasizes the role of managerial decisions in a firm’s subsequent performance (Hoskisson and
Hitt, 1990). Since this theoretical perspective assumes resources to not be as perfectly mobile
(Wernerfelt, 1984), the accessibility of resources will not become possible in some cases unless
they are acquired. Consequently, the role of managers in making the decision is significant, even
in the presence of market influences that exist to some extent (Hitt and Tyler, 1989).
Rooted in agency theory and the pursuit of self-interest by managers of firms (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976), the third theoretical perspective has focused on the personal incentives of
managers to grow firms through diversification. The literature based on this theoretical
perspective, while assuming that market imperfections exist, mostly studies governance
mechanisms that are designed and implemented by firms’ owners to ensure that the owners
suffer minimize losses as a result of managers’ actions.

2.4 Corporate Strategy: Types of Diversification
Firms pursue diversification in different ways. Firms diversify from single-product firms
to limited diversification, related diversification, or unrelated diversification (Barney, 2002).
Perhaps the most widely accepted categorization for diversified firms has been presented by
Rumelt (1974). Rumelt’s classification places diversified firms under one of these groups:
unrelated, related linked, related constrained, and vertically integrated. Also, based on this
classification, firms with low levels of diversification fall into the “single business” type, where
more than 95% of the firm’s revenues are generated from one business, or the “dominant
business” type, where a single business constitutes between 70% and 95% of a firm’s revenues.
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Combined, these are described and recognized as limited diversified firms, and while they have
been of interest to researchers who have studied strategy at the business unit level, they have
been of little interest to corporate strategy researchers.
The second level of diversification that concerns firms is the moderate level of
diversification that has been categorized as related constrained and related linked (Hitt, Ireland,
Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006). When less than 70% of a firm’s revenue comes from its
dominant business and many technological, product, and/or distribution linkages exist among all
businesses of the firm, then the firm is considered to be following a related constrained
diversification strategy. On the other hand, when the technological, product, and/or distribution
linkages among businesses are limited, then the firm is considered to be pursuing a hybrid
strategy between related and unrelated diversification — or, as Rumelt (1974) has stated, a
related linked diversification strategy (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006).
The highest level of diversification belongs to firms when less than 70% of total revenues
come from the corporation’s dominant business unit and linkages between business units are
non-existent (Rumelt, 1974). While existing trends indicate that the number of firms following
this unrelated diversification strategy is declining, there are still successful examples of firms
operating as highly diversified firms (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson, Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006).
The emphasis of this dissertation is mainly placed on two types of diversification, also
known as corporate strategies: related diversification and unrelated diversification. After
defining these concepts, I review the literature on related and unrelated diversification. Then,
comparative studies of the strategic direction of corporations with regards to the extent of
relatedness among their business units are reviewed and analyzed.
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2.4.1 Related Diversification
Firms that have diversified into multiple businesses are considered to be pursuing a
related diversification strategy when any one of their business units accounts for less than 70%
of all the revenues and when linkages between business units in terms of production, technology,
or distribution exist (Rumelt, 1974). Related diversification has often been considered a
corporate strategy that enables firms to better exploit a core set of capabilities in order to achieve
higher performance through creating economies of scope (Teece, 1982; Palepu, 1985). Several
researchers have considered this to be the primary advantage that firms gain through
diversification (Rumelt, 1974; Salter and Weinhold, 1978). Firms that pursue a related
diversification corporate strategy intend to benefit from the created economies of scope and
subsequent revenue and cost advantages. Such economies of scope are often created through
synergies that can be made through sharing knowledge across products and markets (sales
synergy) or skills possessed by management across business units (management synergies)
(Ansoff, 1965; Hoskisson, 1987), as well as optimizing the utilization of facilities and capacities
(Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). A similarity between the operations and markets of business
units allow for the skills and knowledge of managers at one business unit to be redeployed in
resolving issues and enhancing performance in others (Salter and Weinhold, 1978).
The ability to redeploy resources from one business unit to another depends on two
dimensions of relatedness within a corporation: operational relatedness and corporate relatedness
(Hitt, Ireland, and Hoskisson, 2004). Operational relatedness exists within a corporation when
business units are able to share activities among themselves. When skills and knowledge are the
resources shared across business units, then corporate relatedness exists. Corporations that
pursue a related diversification strategy tend to build on the aforementioned two dimensions of
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relatedness in their growth. Subsequently, this allows corporations with related diversification to
better respond to the needs of their business units and to economize on the costs of developing
skills and on the time required to effectively respond to those needs.
Pursuing related diversification is often supported by capabilities that exist within a
firm’s core businesses. Factors like excess capacity in tangible resources such as the sales force
have been suggested to be strong drivers of related diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
However, not all resources support related diversification to the same degree. Resources with
more flexibility in their redeployment can be better utilized and exploited when a firm pursues
diversification. In particular, when a firm pursues a strategy of related diversification, tangible
resources can more easily be shared than financial assets to support interrelationships between
production, sales, marketing, technological, and procurement activities across businesses (Porter,
1987).
Support in pursuing related diversification is not limited only to tangible resources. It has
also been suggested that intangible resources play an important role in inducing related
diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). Rumelt’s (1974) research found intangible
knowledge-based core competencies to be the most common basis for diversification in related
constrained firms. Porter (1985: p. 351) summarized the distinctive essence between tangible and
intangible resources as based on “whether an activity is shared in some way on an ongoing basis,
and whether know-how is shared between essentially separate activities.” While intangible
resources have been favoured by researchers as significant contributors to related diversification,
their flexibility in being utilized has been the issue of some debate.
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There is a consensus in the literature of corporate strategy that not all skills can be
equally transferred across business units. Some skills and intangible resources are considered to
be more mobile when it comes to redeployment. For instance, marketing and customer skills
have been found to be more flexible to transfer, and to yield better results when a firm pursues
some degree of diversification (Capon, Hulert, Farley, and Martin, 1988). However, as Markides
and Williamson (1996) have suggested, the mobility of many resources and skills can be
overestimated and many of them can end up being “trapped” in business units without being
utilized elsewhere.
When a firm pursues a diversification strategy where business units are highly related
(related constrained), its main objective is to ensure that practices, skills, and resources that are
core to its business units are shared appropriately and that their diffusion supports the firm’s
network of internal interdependencies (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Subsequently, the
corporate-level management of the firm faces a situation of reciprocal interdependence
(Thompson, 1967), where gathering essential information and resources and disseminating them
becomes the main focus (Michel and Hambrick, 1992).
However, the existence of relationships among the businesses of a related diversified firm
will not necessarily result in the creation of synergies and economies of scope. In order for firms
to achieve economies of scope when pursuing related diversification, it is necessary for business
units to cooperate with each other (Hitt, Hill, and Hoskisson, 1992). The economic justification
for related diversification is not realized completely unless firms coordinate shared operations
and monitor the interrelationships of their otherwise independent business units to ensure the
creation and persistence of economies of scope (Porter, 1985). Therefore, based on earlier
findings (Sloan, 1963; Berg, 1973; Pitts, 1977), some researchers have suggested a degree of
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centralization to be necessary in order for firms to achieve their expected benefits from related
diversification (Child, 1984). Such centralization is often encouraged for activities that are
common and shared across business units and which form the basis of interdependences within
the firm (Mintzberg, 1983; Hitt, Hill, and Hoskisson, 1992). Moreover, to make sure that
effective interrelationships between business units exist and are maintained, corporations employ
strategic control mechanisms, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

2.4.2 Unrelated Diversification
A firm is pursuing unrelated diversification when any one business unit accounts for less
than 70% of a firm’s revenues and no linkages exist among business units (Rumelt, 1974).
Business units of unrelated diversified firms feel the least interdependence and share practically
none of their resources (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Some researchers have suggested that the
business units of unrelated diversified firms have a “pooled interdependence” (Thompson, 1967),
where direct effects on one another are minimal (Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Therefore, the
business units of firms pursuing unrelated diversification can be considered as independent from
one another (Hoskisson, 1987).
Firms that pursue unrelated diversification are often confined to financial capital and
liquid assets as the main resource to persist in their growth. Unlike related diversified firms that
can benefit from sharing their resources across their multiple connected businesses, a lack of
commonality among resources means that unrelated diversified firms should primarily rely on
more financial resources. Some researchers have suggested that short-term liquid assets and
long-term debt capacity are the most common resources exploited by unrelated diversified firms
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(Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1988). Similar propositions by other researchers have also
emphasized the significance of financial assets and free cash flows in firms’ ability to pursue
unrelated diversification (Penrose, 1959; Jensen, 1986).
The advantages of pursuing unrelated diversification have been debated by several
researchers. While compliance to imposed regulatory pressures was a main driver in the 1960s
and 1970s for firms to diversify into unrelated product markets (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990),
advantages such as capturing market power (Palepu, 1985) and/or reducing risk (Lubatkin and
O’Neil, 1987) have been proposed as other supporting logics to pursue unrelated diversification.
However, there has been a general consensus that, unlike firms that pursue related
diversification, firms that have diversified into unrelated businesses do not seek to benefit from
the economies of scope that are created as a result of interrelationships among business units
(Hoskisson, 1987). Since each business unit of an unrelated diversified firm operates as a
standalone business and does not share any linkages with other business units, the expectation of
synergies is quite unrealistic. Consequently, financial markets in many cases have failed to
recognize unrelated diversification as beneficial (Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987), which has resulted
in a lower allocation of capital to unrelated diversified firms (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
However, unrelated diversified firms are often considered to benefit from other
advantages that result from their multi-business approach. Some researchers have suggested
“governance economies” to be the source of success in firms that pursue unrelated diversification
(Williamson, 1975; Dundas and Richardson, 1982; Jones and Hill, 1988; Hitt, Hill, and
Hoskisson, 1992). Economies of governance are often created as a result of unrelated diversified
firms’ access to financial and other liquid assets, which enables them to allocate financial
resources more efficiently across business units and to ensure that their performances meet those
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of their competition in their relevant product markets. Therefore, the more successful unrelated
diversified firms are those that focus their attention on creating and operating internal capital
markets and the efficient allocation of capital to their business units (Hoskisson, 1987).
In unrelated diversified firms, the mutual independence of business units from one
another and the lack of cooperative linkages among them indicate that an approach to controlling
business units that is different than that for related diversified firms is required at the corporate
level. Much of the focus on successful unrelated diversified firms has been placed on
establishing internal “market-like resource allocation mechanisms,” which are often
accompanied by financial controls in the evaluation of business units’ performances (Hoskisson,
1987). Unrelated diversified firms, similar to holding companies, have been found to give
considerable autonomy to their business units, avoid “horizontal strategies” (Porter, 1985) that
seek coordination between business units, and refrain from direct intervention (Michel and
Hambrick, 1992). Instead, they mostly focus their attention on the allocation of financial
resources among their business units in more efficient ways than traditional holding companies
typically do (Dundas and Richardson, 1982). Conversely, emphasizing the integration of
operations at the business unit level and limiting the autonomy of business units has been found
to result in poor performance and inefficiency of the internal capital market in unrelated
diversified firms (Lorsch and Allen, 1973).

2.5 Diversification and Performance
Most scholarly work on diversification has been focused on its link with firm
performance, both at the corporate and business unit levels. This focus has been in line with the
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predominant interest in the literature of strategic management, which focuses on the performance
consequences of firms’ strategic decisions and actions. Much of the past literature has used
various theoretical lenses to investigate and find empirical support for the linkage between
industry influences, idiosyncratic business factors, top management cognitive abilities, and
corporate effects on the performance of single business units and corporations (Bowman and
Helfat, 2001).
While support for some of these theoretical perspectives has been strong, others have met
more conflicting results. The link between corporate strategy and performance has been one such
area and there is yet to be substantive support for corporate strategy’s effect on the performance
of the firm at the corporate level. This has resulted in a general confusion regarding the nature of
the diversification–performance relationship (Reed and Luffman, 1986). Subsequently, some
have pointed to the uselessness of research in this area, considering it a waste of time (Bowman
and Helfat, 2001). However, most past literature suggests moderate diversification (i.e., related)
to be more optimal than unrelated diversification (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
A stream of research that has studied the link between diversification and performance
has built on the structure–conduct–performance paradigm of the industrial organization
literature, which assumes industry effects and market factors to be primarily responsible for
business unit performance (Schmalansee, 1985). The theoretical perspective that favours
industrial organization economics posits that diversification can positively influence corporate or
business unit performance through increasing market power (Markham, 1973). Based on this
theoretical perspective, some theorists have proposed cross-subsidization, raising barriers to
entry, predatory pricing, and reciprocity in buying and selling as competitive practices that can
be exercised as the result of market power gained subsequent to pursuing diversification (Palepu,
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1985). Furthermore, it has been argued that more diversified firms are better able to conceal the
profitability of their business units from competitors as the result of “information loss” that
occurs during consolidated reporting, increasing chances of extracting supernormal profits
(Palepu, 1985). However, most of the literature that is rooted in the industrial organization
economics perspective assumes the homogeneity of firms and factor markets as well as relative
market perfection, resulting in very similar substitute products. The limited role of resource
heterogeneity in this Industrial Organization (I/O) perspective leaves little rational incentive for
firms to diversify into other product markets, as their performance is very unlikely to be
positively affected (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
Contrary to the industrial organization perspective, there is a theoretical approach that
assumes heterogeneity to drive firms to pursue diversification. Based on this theoretical
perspective, firms can achieve supernormal profitability when they build on their core
competencies to grow or acquire external resources through the acquisition of other businesses
(Barney, 1986; Peteraf, 1993). Proponents of this theoretical perspective posit that firms are able
to achieve higher levels of performance through exploiting synergies that are created as a result
of economies of scope. Therefore, most literature from this perspective assumes that firms
pursue diversification to maximize firm value (Salter and Weinhold, 1978) through organic
growth or acquiring firms with some degree of relatedness to reap synergistic efficiencies
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990) that can result in market power over competitors (Bradley, Desai, and
Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1985).
The theoretical work on the link between diversification and performance at the corporate
and business unit levels has been followed by much empirical research (e.g., Amit and Livnat,
1988; Bettis and Hall, 1981; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Montgomery, 1985; Rumelt,
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1974, 1982, 1991; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992; McGahan
and Porter, 1997, 1999; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). The conflicting results in past research have
led to an unresolved debate on whether corporate strategy does in fact matter in determining
corporate and business unit performance (Ramanujam and Varadarajan, 1989). Based on the
literature of industrial organization, early studies by Gort (1962), Arnould (1969), and Markham
(1973) have found no significant support for the cross-sectional relationship between total
diversification and corporate performance. The non-significant cross-sectional analysis was also
supported by a later study conducted by Palepu (1985). Subsequent findings by Rumelt (1991)
and later by McGahan and Porter (1997, 1999) suggested business-unit-level factors to be the
strongest predictor of business unit performance, followed by influences from industry. Such
findings have led many other researchers to postulate corporate effects, including corporate
strategy, to be very insignificant to non-existent (Carroll, 1993; Ghemawat and Ricart Costa,
1993; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993; Ghemawat, 1994). The literature in finance has also
found personal portfolio diversification to be more related to value creation than diversification
pursued by firms at the corporate level (Reid, 1968; Watson and Mansinghka, 1971; Watson,
Smith, and Sherives, 1972; Melicher and Rush, 1973; Smith and Watson, 1977).
Conversely, many empirical studies have found diversification and other corporate
effects to significantly influence business unit performance. One of the earliest and most cited
studies (Rumelt, 1974) found significant performance differences across seven of the nine
diversification strategy categories that were identified. Later research also found subsequent
performance for firms with different levels of diversification to be more or less different (Bettis
and Hall, 1981; Stubbart, 1983; Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985; Hoskisson, 1987;
Lubatkin and Rogers, 1987; Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987; Varadarajan and Ramanujam, 1987;
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Barton, 1988; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988), lending further support to Rumelt’s (1974,
1982) findings. Later, Bowman and Helfat (2001) found significant support for the influence of
corporate effects on firms’ subsequent performance. However, they came short of unpacking
corporate effects to truly test for the significance of corporate strategy on business unit
performance.

2.6 Corporate Strategy and Performance
While there is a large body of literature that argues for and against the role of corporate
effects on business unit and corporate-level performance, the corporate strategy pursued has also
been discussed as an influencing factor on business unit performance. In some cases, related
diversified firms have been suggested to perform better than unrelated diversified firms (Rumelt,
1974, 1982; Christensen and Montgomery, 1981; Palepu, 1985). Rumelt (1974) conducted a
study on differences in performance across firms pursuing constrained diversification strategies
(dominant constrained and related constrained) and those pursuing less constrained
diversification strategies (e.g., related linked, single business, unrelated businesses). His findings
showed that firms pursuing more constrained diversification strategies outperformed firms
pursuing the other types — findings that were also confirmed in subsequent studies by other
researchers (e.g., Bettis and Hall, 1981; Hoskisson, 1987; Lubatkin and O’Neil, 1987;
Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985; Stubbart, 1983; Varadarajan and Ramanujam,
1987; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988). These results have also been found to hold for firms’
profit performance and their risk and return in the market (Barton, 1988; Lubatkin and O’Neil,
1987; Lubatkin and Rogers, 1987; Montgomery and Singh, 1984).
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The superiority in performance of related diversified firms has been found not to be
limited to cross-sectional points in time, but also to be present over extended time periods. For
example, Palepu (1985) found that corporations following related diversification achieved
significantly higher performance over extended periods of time than unrelated diversified
corporations. However, to achieve this higher level of performance, diversification most likely
needs to be achieved through means of organic growth. Diversification through acquisition can
create value for the acquiring firm only if the target and acquiring firms share common “private
and uniquely” or “inimitable” value cash flows (Barney, 1988; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990). It is
commonly assumed by strategy researchers that acquisitions take place by firms in order to
maximize their own value (Salter and Weinhold, 1978) through creating synergies that arise as a
result of efficiencies achieved through combining their own resources and those of the acquired
firms (Hoskisson and Hitt, 190). Synergies that result from efficiencies provide firms with the
ability to exert market power over their direct and indirect competitors (Bradley, Desai, and Kim,
1983; Eckbo, 1985; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1900). Hence, this position assumes an acquisition to
yield above-average performance when it results in some form of relatedness.
Firms that diversify through the acquisition of other firms, even when the acquired firm is
operating in a related field, often fail to benefit from the same levels of higher performance as
firms who have diversified as the result of organic growth (Singh and Montgomery, 1987). This
position has been disputed by some researchers who have noted difficulties associated with
transferring and combining resources and capabilities within different parts of the firm, citing
them as “trapped” within firm structure (Markides and Williamson, 1996).
Despite the existence of a relatively large body of literature that emphasizes the
superiority of related diversification over unrelated diversification in regards to performance,
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there are studies that have disagreed with this conclusion. For instance, studies conducted by
Michel and Shaked (1984), Johnson and Thomas (1987), and Lubatkin (1987) have not found a
significant difference in performance for firms that pursue related or unrelated diversification. As
a result, a consensus on this issue is yet to be achieved on the basis of existing empirical
evidence.
Later research has shown significant progress in regards to making the distinction
between related and unrelated diversification, and also in distinguishing between the levels of
diversification that are pursued by firms. However, Rumelt’s (1974, 1982) studies, although
making the distinction between different types of diversification, used cross-sectional data and
often employed dichotomous measures and failed to recognize differences in the levels of
diversification pursued by firms. Likewise, Palepu’s (1985) study, while accounting for the level
of diversification and extending the timeframe to account for growth in performance, overlooked
corporations’ internal structure or controls. This shortcoming is also evident in the works of
those who have argued against (McGahan and Porter, 1997, 1998) or for (Helfat and Bowman,
2003) the significance of corporate effects on performance. This has resulted in the role of
“controls” being understudied in empirical research that has focused on the relationship between
corporate strategy and performance at the corporate and business unit level.

2.7 Summary
Corporate strategy focuses on the orientation that firms can take in pursuing
diversification into other product markets as well as the manner in which such orientation
influences their value-creation mechanism. Despite a variety of categorical approaches that have
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been proposed in the past to determine the types of corporate strategy, the dominant approach
has been to understand diversification strategies as related and unrelated diversification. While
both these approaches are similar in that they require firms’ presence in multiple product
markets, they differ significantly on the logic of how they create value. Where related
diversification relies largely on the creation and extraction of synergistic value that results from
the interrelationships of business units, unrelated diversification follows the dominant logic that
exists at undiversified businesses, where each business unit is responsible for its own
performance and the aggregate performance of the business is not synergistic in nature.
Past research has made attempts to understand how influences from the corporate level
affect the performance of business units. Such research has studied the relationships between
diversification, corporate effects, and corporate strategy with the performances of business units
and the corporation. However, such research mainly falls short of establishing the quality of the
relationship between corporate strategy and business unit performance and, more specifically,
the mechanism through which corporate strategy influences business unit strategy. Moreover,
corporate effects need to be deconstructed so that the aforementioned relationship can be truly
understood.
In this chapter, the theoretical foundations for corporate strategy, as a construct of interest
in the theoretical model that is proposed, have been established. To achieve this objective, a
review of the literature in the area of diversification and corporate strategy has been conducted
and the contrasts between findings and propositions have been identified. In the following
chapters, the relationship between corporate strategy and other constructs that are included in the
model are discussed and corresponding hypotheses are proposed.
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CHAPTER 3: CONTROLS

3.1 Introduction
Although the effect of corporate strategy on business unit and corporate performance and
vice versa has been of interest to many strategic management researchers, the effect that
strategies at the corporate level might have on the strategic orientation of business units and their
subsequent success or failure in the execution of those strategies has not been investigated in
depth. A main objective of this dissertation is to understand whether business unit strategy is
influenced and constrained by corporate strategy and to provide empirical evidence to support
the hypotheses that point to the existence of such an effect. Therefore, the role of controls as
perhaps the most important mechanism that connects a business unit to its corporate parent is of
particular interest.
With separation of ownership and management in the modern organization (Smith,
1776), several theoretical perspectives have emerged that have focused on the relationship
between principals and agents. According to agency theory, the principal–agent relationship is
formed when one party acts on behalf of the other (Shapiro, 2004). Therefore, agency theory has
a special interest in understanding the causes and consequences of the incongruence in goals that
arises between the goals of agents and those of principal owners (Barney and Hesterly, 1996).
Agency theory assumes that individuals are self-interested, risk-averse, bounded by rationality,
and exploitative of existing information asymmetries to their advantage, at the expense of
principal owners, in order to maximize their own — the managers’ — utility (Eisenhardt, 1988,
1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1988). Therefore, to ensure that decisions made and
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actions taken by executives (agents) do not diverge from those that yield the highest performance
and prioritize the interests of principal owners, monitoring mechanisms should be put in place to
monitor both the behaviour of executives and the outcomes of their actions at the business unit
level (Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989). A logical consequence of agency theory is the design and
implementation of control mechanisms to ensure alignment in the interests of principals and
agents (Carpenter and Sanders, 2002) and to transfer potential negative consequences of agency
problems from owners to decision makers (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In
corporations, agents (i.e., CEOs of wholly owned business units) whose performances and
behaviours are or are not perceived to be in the best interests of the corporation will be
compensated or punished by existing control mechanisms. Such mechanisms may target
financial benefits or continuation of tenure (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Differences in corporate strategy pursued by firms have resulted in different sources for
the creation of value at the corporate level. For example, firms that pursue a corporate strategy of
related diversification have been suggested to extract their value mostly from economies of
scope, whereas the governance of economies has been proposed as the main source for value
creation within unrelated diversified corporations (Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson, 1992). The
distinctions inherent in each type of corporate strategy require controls that can properly
distinguish between sources of value creation and can ensure that the interests of the principals
are met.
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3.2 Types of Corporate Controls
Controls are mechanisms that are put in place by the corporate headquarters in order to
evaluate the performance of business units and ensure that the decisions made and actions taken
by business unit senior executives are aligned with the best interests of the corporation.
Corporate headquarters might use financial controls, strategic controls, or a hybrid of strategic
and financial controls for this purpose. However, while different types of controls are generally
employed for the same objective, they employ distinctive processes and have implications that
could be quite different.

3.2.1 Financial Controls
Financial controls are considered to be those that rely primarily on financial and
accounting evaluations of firm performance, regardless of the processes through which such
performance has been achieved. Such performance, which is generally reported through annual
and quarterly reports, consists of such indicators as return on assets (ROA), return on
investments (ROI), and earnings per share (EPS) (for holding companies). The generic nature of
such controls makes them applicable to a wide array of businesses and they can be employed
with or without limited knowledge or expertise regarding the business when they are the sole
method of performance evaluation.
Since financial controls rely heavily on accounting information, any internal actions,
decisions, or external factors that could affect the bottom line negatively at a given time could
result in firm performance being perceived as inferior when financial controls are the only source
of performance evaluation. Moreover, since financial controls rest on indicators that are updated
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and presented annually or at the end of each quarter, comparisons are made on an annual or
quarterly basis. Executives of businesses that are controlled on the basis of financials are more
constrained in making decisions that have expected results beyond financial milestones. When
corporations rely only on financial controls and do not take into consideration the strategic and
long-term implications of decisions made at the business unit level, the justification of decisions
with negative impacts on financial and accounting indicators becomes irrelevant, and business
unit senior executives receive better assessments when their decisions are associated with the
least negative short-term financial performance. Consequently, the tendency of such business
unit managers is to avoid actions or decisions with prospects that diverge from any of the
financial and accounting milestones.
Financial controls are usually employed as the sole control mechanism when the
corporate headquarters is incapable of putting in place strategic controls due to a lack of
resources or expertise, or when environmental conditions and industry characteristics represent
high levels of stability, where minimal strategic decisions at the business unit level are required.
The generic nature of financial controls and the similarity of assessment of financial and
accounting indicators across different types of businesses provide the corporate headquarters
with the ability to evaluate each business unit within the context of its industry, with limited
knowledge about the nature of the business and without requiring it to monitor actions or
decisions that have led to such performance.
The generic nature of financial controls and the transferability of the knowledge required
to implement such controls across different businesses implies that a lower level of information
processing capacity at the corporate headquarters will be required. Executives at the corporate
headquarters will be able to readily employ and redeploy the same controlling capabilities to
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make assessments of business-level performance, which will allow for more unused information
processing capacity to be allocated elsewhere. Also, the absence of relevant knowledge or
expertise will not be considered a problem when financial controls are the only method of
monitoring business unit performance.
While financial controls seem to allow more flexibility for the business unit executives to
make strategic decisions and take actions in accordance with what they perceive to be best for
the success of their business unit, they are also associated with implicit constraints to make
decisions that satisfy the financial expectations of the corporate headquarters from one quarter to
another. Under such controls, it would be difficult to justify decisions of investments that are
expected to yield results only in the long run. Therefore, the initial perception of latitude under
financial controls would diminish under the pressures and expectations of the corporate
headquarters.

3.2.2 Strategic Controls
Strategic controls are those that focus on the quality of the decisions made and the longterm strategic implications of any actions taken (Rowe and Wright, 1997). Strategic controls are
qualitative, subjective, and evaluative. They also focus on the effect that decisions and actions at
the business unit level have on other business units and the fit of strategic decisions of each
business unit with the strategies of the corporation as a whole. The relationships between
business units and the quality and nature of those relationships are other dimensions of business
unit performance that are included in the strategic evaluation of performance for each business
unit.
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When implementing strategic controls, corporations often hesitate to completely neglect
the financial performance of business units. In most instances, strategic and financial controls are
often implemented simultaneously, which enables the corporate headquarters to take the strategic
implications of business unit performance in its evaluations into consideration. However, when
both strategic controls and financial controls are implemented, the emphasis should be on
strategic controls, since strategic actions may not necessarily have short-term positive influence
on the financial performance of a business unit.
However, implementing strategic controls, unlike financial controls, requires the
corporate headquarters to possess considerable knowledge and expertise in the field in which the
business unit is operating (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). Such expertise is required for conducting
in-depth analysis of the actions and strategic decisions made by executives at the business unit
level and to understand the implications that such actions and decisions might carry. Unless such
expertise exists, the qualitative monitoring of processes and the actions of businesses are unlikely
to yield valuable results, and therefore strategic controls will not be put in place properly and the
corporate headquarters will be forced to rely on the immediate financial implications of business
unit actions.
When corporations diversify, an important intent of implementing strategic controls is to
monitor the interrelationships of different business units and to ensure that the economies of
scope that are expected from synergies between business units are realized. However, such
interrelationships can often affect business units’ short-term financial performance. Putting in
place strategic controls enables corporations to integrate the strategic implications of business
unit actions into their performance evaluation and ensure business unit executives that the
potential lower subsequent financial performance may be justifiable by their strategic actions.
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Therefore, executives at the business unit level will be more likely to have latitude in
pursuing strategies that ensure higher long-term business performance and will be less pressured
to make decisions solely on their short-term performance outcomes. However, their latitude in
strategic decision making will also be limited by strategic decisions that are made at the
corporate level, and they might be forced to make decisions that would contribute more to the
performance of other business units of the corporation and, as a result, the corporation as a
whole.
Similar to other types of diagnostic control systems, strategic controls are developed and
implemented to allow for effective resource allocation, define goals, provide motivation,
establish guidelines for correct action, allow for ex-post evaluation, and free scarce management
attention (Simons, 1994). Financial controls employ objective measures and assessments of
performance, while strategic controls rely on more qualitative and subjective evaluations. The
distinctive embodiment of strategic controls in organizations can often involve frequent meetings
between the business unit manager and the corporate staff in order to further facilitate the
corporate headquarters’ understanding of the decisions that are made at the business unit level.
As such, business units that are more subject to strategic controls can be expected to become
subject to evaluation methods that encourage interrelationships between them and other business
units of their corporate parent and to exercise greater autonomy in their actions (Vancil, 1979;
White, 1986). Consequently, a positive attitude towards taking risky actions such as R&D
spending can also be expected to characterize strategically controlled business units.

46

3.3 Controls and Diversification Strategy
As mentioned previously, corporations employ different types of controls in order to
ensure that their business units perform in accordance with the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders. Corporations that pursue different strategies create value through
mechanisms that are different. Economies of scope, which are fundamental to achieving superior
performance in related diversified corporations, become non-existent when firms pursue
unrelated diversification. Therefore, differences also exist in the control mechanisms that are put
in place in corporations pursuing different corporate-level strategies.
As mentioned earlier, corporations that pursue related diversification seek to benefit from
synergies that evolve as a result of shared practices or inputs that exist between business units,
which in turn results in economies of scope and market power over competitors (Bradley, Desai,
and Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1985). The realization of performance that is expected to be associated
with related diversification requires corporate headquarters to exercise controls over business
units to ensure that coordination among them is retained and that their interdependencies on
common functions remain intact (Mintzberg, 1983). Therefore, the performance of business units
in such corporations needs to be evaluated based not only on their individual profitability, but
also on their alignment with other business units of the corporation and their contribution to the
overall corporate performance. As a result, the evaluation of performance of such business units,
in most cases, is not solely based on objective financial evaluation measures, but also on
subjective methods that allow for business units’ performances to be more fairly evaluated (Kerr,
1985).
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Hence, to realize benefits from related diversification, besides simple financial controls,
the corporate headquarters of corporations also rely on more complex controls that consider
more thoroughly the strategic implications of actions of the business units, thus minimizing
value-destroying internal competition among business units and emphasizing corporate
synergistic value creation in performance assessments. Since in related diversified corporations
performance is enhanced through synergies created from the relationships of several business
units, the strategic control and monitoring of the firm not only encompasses strategic decisions
and actions taken in each individual business unit, but also relationships between business units,
to ensure that necessary conditions for creating and maintaining synergies are met.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the corporate headquarters of related diversified
corporations primarily rely more on strategic controls instead of only financial controls
(Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). However, employing strategic controls will not be beneficial
for corporations unless they result in superior financial performance. Therefore, in related
diversified corporations, strategic controls need to be accompanied with appropriate financial
controls to ensure that strategic performance will eventually yield desirable financial results.
While strategic controls require in-depth monitoring of decisions and actions taken by
each business unit, the relatedness of activities or resources of business units of related
diversified corporations means that the corporate headquarters possesses a higher competency in
redeploying existing knowledge or expertise that relates one business to another business unit for
control purposes. As a result, the depth of knowledge in one area can be redeployed and utilized
for monitoring another area of activity.
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Employing strategic controls requires a more in-depth understanding and monitoring of
decisions within each business unit in order to act as a mechanism to prevent intra-corporation
competition between various business units.
Unlike firms that pursue related diversification, unrelated diversified firms do not seek to
benefit from economies of scope. The non-existence of operational synergies between business
units (Palepu, 1985) means that such firms are unable to transfer their expertise and knowledge
from one business unit to another and, therefore, each business unit is responsible for its own
performance. Consequently, to monitor each of the business units thoroughly, a separate set of
skills and know-how is required. Moreover, because each business unit in an unrelated
diversified corporation does not share resources or activities with other business units of the
corporation, unlike in the case of related diversified corporations, its performance is not expected
to have a direct or indirect positive or negative effect on any other business unit of the
corporation. As a result, its contribution to the overall performance of the corporation will be its
own individual performance. Therefore, the strategic monitoring of business units in such
corporations is based solely on strategic actions and decisions that yield optimal performance for
the same business unit. Hence, most unrelated diversified firms follow control structures similar
to what has been proposed in Williamson’s (1975) M-form, where divisional performance
receives the main emphasis (Hoskisson, 1987). This approach has resulted in firms pursuing
unrelated diversification to employ stock-market-like resource-allocation mechanisms, such as
transfer pricing, and to primarily rely on simple financial controls and divisional incentives in
order to ensure and maintain the performance of each business unit (Hoskisson, 1987).
The methods for control in unrelated diversified firms mostly rely on highly quantitative
systems and rarely scrutinize actions and decisions qualitatively (Dundas and Richardson, 1982;
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Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Past research has found that successful cases of implementation of
financial controls have often been accompanied by considerable autonomy in managing
operations at each divisional unit (Dundas and Richardson, 1982).
With an increase in the diversity of business that an unrelated diversified firm is engaged
in, the expertise and capability of corporate headquarters to exercise monitoring requirements
that are sufficient for strategic control is stretched. In an unrelated diversified corporation, when
the range of activities pursued by different business units exceeds the range of expertise
possessed by the corporate CEO and corporate staff, its ability to process information regarding
the strategic actions of each business unit and to make appropriate decisions is stretched beyond
the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information. Consequently, the benefits of
establishing and exercising strategic controls suffer tremendously.
Since the CEO of the corporation serves as the ultimate decision maker, their lack of
necessary know-how or expertise to effectively oversee strategic controls leads them to depend
on controlling and monitoring mechanisms that rely on such requirements to a lesser degree. As
a result, the performance of business units is more likely to be assessed based on their quarterly
and/or annual financial and accounting performance reports. Furthermore, increasing the number
of unrelated business units that need to be controlled suggests that the corporate CEO needs to
spend more of his or her available information processing capacity to remain effective. Under
such circumstances, the tendency is to employ financial and accounting controls instead of
strategic controls (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). As a result, the performance of such business units
is more likely to be assessed based on their quarterly and/or annual financial and accounting
performance reports. Hence:
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Hypothesis 1: Corporations that pursue related diversification are likely to put a
stronger emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls as their primary
mechanism of controlling their business units. Conversely, corporations that
pursue unrelated diversification are likely to put a stronger emphasis on financial
controls versus strategic controls as their primary mechanism of controlling their
business units.

3.4 Corporate Headquarters
Diversification has been suggested to have major impacts on a firm’s performance,
investment in R&D, commitment of business-level management to innovation, risk taking of
business unit executives, and interrelationships between business units (Hoskisson, 1987;
Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland, 1991; Hill, Hitt, and Hoskisson,
1992). To realize the benefits that are associated with such impacts, corporations need to put in
place controls that are designed at the headquarters of the corporation (Rowe and Wright, 1997).
With the emergence of diversified firms that have adopted the M-form structure, a main
advantage has been the ability of the diversified firm to centralize financial and decision control
mechanisms within a corporate headquarters (Williamson, 1975).
The role of the corporate headquarters — i.e., the corporate CEO and corporate staff — is
mainly to oversee the operations of business units and ensure that their performance yields
results that are aligned with the best interests of the corporation, thus providing grounds for the
highest overall corporate-level performance to be achieved. Therefore, corporate headquarters
are mainly focused on designing and implementing control mechanisms that ensure that
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corporate objectives are realized. However, while the ability of the corporate headquarters to
implement controls is influenced by the corporation’s strategic orientation (i.e., related
diversification versus unrelated diversification), this relationship is also moderated by other
factors that are rooted in the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information.

3.4.1 Information Processing Capacity
The ability of the corporate headquarters to appropriately exercise its responsibility in
monitoring and controlling the decisions and actions taken by business units rests on the ability
of the corporate staff to process the information that relates to each business unit (Hill and
Hoskisson, 1987). The limitations arising from the bounded rationality of individuals that work
in the corporate office (Simon, 1957), in turn, result in the information processing capability of
the corporate headquarters being limited (March and Simon, 1958). Subsequently, there is a limit
to the amount of information that can be successfully monitored at the corporate level. There are,
however, several factors that can influence the ability of those within a corporate office to be
effective at processing information. Such factors include the size of the corporate office, the
related expertise of the corporate CEO, and the number of businesses that are owned by the
corporation.

3.4.2 Size of Corporate Headquarters
The responsibility of monitoring performance at the business unit level and controlling
actions and decisions made by business unit executives is held within the domain of the
corporate headquarters (Rowe and Wright, 1997). The ability of the corporate headquarters to
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properly monitor the performance of business units is tied to the aggregate ability of individuals
at the corporate headquarters to receive, process, and analyze information coming from each
business unit. Any limitation in this regard means that the corporation will be less capable of
making in-depth assessments of actions taken or decisions made by senior managers at business
units (March and Simon, 1958).
When the corporation headquarters’ staff have limitations in evaluating the quality of
strategic decisions at the business unit level, it is more inclined to put in place controls that have
lower requirements for monitoring activity. The ability of the corporate headquarters to handle
the strategic control of business units is tied to the aggregate capability of individuals and the
synergies they create through their internal interactions. Therefore, corporate headquarters that
are smaller in size will likely be capable of processing less information, if all other things are
equal.
As mentioned previously, the ability of the corporate headquarters to process information
related to each business unit plays an important role in its ability to implement controls on the
business unit. When this ability is limited, the corporate headquarters will have to rely on types
of controls that are more conformable to its resources. For corporations that pursue unrelated
diversification, their capacity to process information about each of their business units will be
further engaged with the addition of each new business unit. Unless a corporate headquarters
takes actions to create additional capacity for monitoring business units, it will be limited to
implementing financial controls as the corporation increases in diversity.
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Figure 3.1: Based on Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990)

Related diversified corporations encounter similar obstacles in implementing their
preferred strategic controls as the number of their business units increases. However, existing
interrelationships between business units in related diversified corporations mean that the
capacity of corporate headquarters to process information will diminish at an exponential rate
compared to that of unrelated diversified corporations (see Figure 3.1). To process the
information relevant to their business units, corporate headquarters rely on the capabilities and
performance of their (corporate headquarters’) staff, which may or may not be organized into
specialized units. While organizational differences in corporate headquarters may influence the
capacity to process information, the number of staff, regardless of task specialization, still plays
an important role in defining the extent to which a corporate headquarters can competently and
effectively process information. Therefore,

under conditions resulting from

related

diversification where more information must be processed, corporations with more staff in their
headquarters will be in a position of advantage in terms of available information processing
capacity; a larger number of staff in headquarters allows them to better emphasize strategic
controls. Hence:
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Hypothesis 2: The size of the corporate office (i.e., the number of corporate
staff) moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate
controls; under the condition of a larger corporate office, there will be a
stronger effect between a corporate strategy of related diversification and the
emphasis on strategic controls, while under the condition of smaller corporate
offices there will be a weaker effect.

3.4.3 Relevant Expertise of the Corporate CEO
As previously mentioned, the corporate CEO’s ability to process and analyze information
related to the corporation’s business units is an important determinant of their ability to
implement strategic controls, since the ultimate decision-making authority lies with the corporate
CEO. Therefore, under different conditions of the expertise and related knowledge of the
corporate CEO, the impact of corporate-level strategy on corporate-level controls will be
different.
When a corporate CEO possesses prior expertise, knowledge, or experience in areas
identical or similar to those of certain business units, they have a higher capability than those
CEOs without such a background to understand and evaluate information regarding decisions
made or actions taken by senior executives at the business unit level. This will put such a CEO in
a better position to make qualitative assessments of business-level performance and make
appropriate decisions, and will in turn increase the ability to implement and exercise strategic
control. In contrast, a corporate CEO without any relevant background on their corporation’s
business units will find it more difficult to properly evaluate the quality of decisions made by
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business unit managers and their impact on the business units’ and corporation’s competitiveness
and long-term performance. Therefore, they will tend to rely on types of controls that are less
demanding in terms of strategic expertise and are more financial in nature.
As argued before, the expertise that the corporate CEO possesses and the quality of
vigilance that they can provide moderate the ability of the corporation to emphasize strategic
controls when related diversification is pursued as the corporate-level strategy. In other words,
the more qualified the CEO is, the more likely the pursuit of related diversification will lead to a
stronger emphasis on implementing and exercising strategic controls. Likewise, even when a
corporation is pursuing related diversification, the lack of or deficiency of relevant expertise by
the corporate CEO will attenuate the corporation’s emphasis on strategic controls. Consequently,
pursuing related diversification will be less effective in increasing the emphasis and maintenance
of exercising strategic controls by corporate headquarters and there will be less emphasis on
strategic controls and more reliance on financial controls. Therefore:

Hypothesis 3: The corporate CEO’s relevance of past experience relative to a
business unit moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and
corporate controls; in the presence of a corporate CEO who possesses relevant
expertise related to a business unit, there will be a stronger relationship between
related diversification and emphasis on strategic control.
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3.4.4 Number of Business Units and Headquarters’ Effectiveness
The number of business units owned by a corporation also moderates the effect of
corporate strategy on the monitoring and control mechanism emphasized for the business units.
Past research has suggested that the information processing capability of corporations is a
constant factor in the short term and that the effectiveness of a corporate headquarters to monitor
and control each business unit will decrease as the number of business units increases. Therefore,
it has been suggested that corporations with a larger number of business units tend to rely on less
demanding financial controls (Rowe and Wright, 1997).
Corporate headquarters are not unlimited in their capacity to process information. With
the increase in the number of business units in corporations, whether they are related or
unrelated, corporations experience a shortage of information processing capacity unless they take
steps to address this issue. Therefore, when pursuing related diversification, the ability of
corporations to emphasize strategic control will be affected when they grow the number of their
business units. With a larger number of business units, corporations will fail to effectively
exercise strategic controls unless they take appropriate steps to increase the information
processing capacity of their corporate headquarters. Therefore:

Hypothesis 4: The number of business units owned by a corporation moderates
the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; the positive
relationship between related diversification and emphasizing strategic controls
will be weaker when the number of business units is greater.
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3.5 Summary
Controls are important mechanisms that enable corporations to ensure that their economic
justifications for existence are being realized through alignment between action at the business
unit level and corporate objectives. Therefore, understanding the relationship between corporate
strategy and controls is very important for understanding the effect that corporate strategy has on
the performance of business units. Corporate controls have often been considered to fall into one
of two categories: the more qualitative strategic controls, and the more objective and quantitative
financial controls (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1987).
Corporations that pursue related diversification are those that expect to benefit from the
economic value that is created as a result of synergies that exist between their various business
units. In order for such objectives to be realized, the role of the corporate headquarters is to
ensure that the interrelationships between business units are maintained and that overall
performance is achieved. Therefore, the assessment of the performance of business units in such
corporations should be based not only on their standalone financial performance, but on the
degree to which they fit into the overall strategy of the corporation.
Consequently, this dissertation has hypothesized that related diversified corporations are
more likely to rely on strategic controls in addition to financial controls. In contrast, since
business units in unrelated diversified corporations are not expected to create synergies, the
corporate headquarters will tend to rely on financial controls. Therefore, this dissertation has
argued that in such corporations, financial controls are more likely to be the primary mechanism
of control.
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On the other hand, the ability of a corporate headquarters in implementing any control
mechanisms relies on its ability to process information. Therefore, this dissertation has argued
for the moderating roles of the size of the corporate headquarters, the related expertise of the
CEO, and the number of business units owned by the corporation, on the relationship between
corporation strategy and corporate controls.
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CHAPTER 4: BUSINESS STRATEGY

4.1 Introduction
Understanding strategy at the level of business units has been the centre of much research
in strategy literature. This interest has resulted in attempts by strategic management scholars to
identify and propose different typological perspectives in order to better distinguish between
strategies pursued by different businesses. Since the initial presentation of Miles and Snow’s
(1978) prospector, defender, analyzer, and reactor strategy categories, several other strategy
typologies have been presented, the most widely accepted and cited of them being Porter’s
(1980) generic strategies of cost leadership, product differentiation, and focus. Also, taking a
more process-oriented approach, March (1991) and Levinthal and March (1993) proposed a new
typology for the strategic approach of firms: exploration and exploitation. There have been
several attempts made by researchers in the past to focus on similarities and distinctions that
exist between these strategy typologies. Also, some researchers have conducted empirical
research to find the relationship between these strategy typologies and firm performance (Uotila,
Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009; Thornhill and White, 2007).
Discounting some exceptions (Hill, 1988), there is a general consensus on the idea that
“cost leadership” and “product differentiation” (Porter, 1980) are strategies at different ends of a
continuum and that firms trying to pursue both simultaneously will end up in a stuck-in-themiddle position where performance is lowest — a consensus that has been further supported by
empirical findings on strategy purity (Thornhill and White, 2007). On the other hand, researchers
focusing on exploration and exploitation have found the simultaneous pursuance of exploration
and exploitation to be associated with higher performance (Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009)
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and that these two approaches could be considered to be orthogonal and not necessarily two ends
of a continuum (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2006).
While there is an extensive body of research on business-level strategy, the connection
between strategy at the corporate level and business unit level still remains unclear. Most past
research has failed to either deconstruct business effects to distinguish business strategy, or to
consider how business unit strategy is developed in the context of a corporation. Moreover, past
research that has studied the influence of business unit strategy and corporate-level strategy on
business unit performance has either simply identified business unit strategy as an exogenous
(i.e., independent) variable, or has focused on corporate effects and business unit effects, without
deconstructing either properly. Consequently, corporate effects have been understood to have a
homogeneous influence across all business units. This has further clouded the understanding of
the effect that corporate strategy might have on the strategy pursued by each individual business
unit.
This chapter aims to take a more in-depth look into strategies that are pursued at the
business unit level. Furthermore, based on existing literature related to agency theory, this
chapter will explore and establish the link between business unit strategy and corporate controls
as its antecedent. In this chapter, while noting the differences between March’s (1991) notion of
exploration and exploitation, and Porter’s (1980) generic strategies, their similarities will be
emphasized as different strategic directions that business units can pursue. The proposed
theoretical arguments in this chapter will posit business unit strategy not to be an independent
factor, but one endogenous to controls that are put in place by the corporate headquarters.
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4.2 Business-level Strategy
Business-level strategy refers to the competitive actions pursued by business units in
order to create differences in the competitive position of one business relative to its direct or
indirect competitors (Porter, 1988). To achieve this objective, businesses have to make a series
of decisions regarding their resource-allocation procedures in order to improve the competitive
position of their business unit within their relative product market (Dundas and Richardson,
1980). Such decisions mostly revolve around performing certain activities differently, or
performing activities that are fundamentally different, relative to other competitors (Porter,
1996). Making decisions and executing them requires a degree of deliberation on the part of
business unit managers and a willingness to create unique value through executing well on
primary and support activities throughout the value chain. In corporations with multiple business
units, these decisions and actions are often made at the level of the business unit, and the main
concern at the corporate headquarters is to ensure that the results are aligned with the best
interests of the business unit and the corporation.
The concept of business-level strategy is one that gained prominence during the 1960s
through the works of Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth (1965) and Andrews (1965).
Since then, the body of literature on the subject has grown tremendously, turning it arguably into
one of the most attractive topics in management literature. This interest has resulted in many
scholars pursuing classifications and categorizations of different strategies that can be pursued at
the level of a business unit and linking them to the success or failure of firms. While some
studies have found a strong connection between performance and strategy (e.g., Thornhill and
White, 2007), it has been suggested that business-level strategy is not effective unless a fit
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between the strategies, external environmental conditions, and internal resources and capabilities
of the business unit exists (Hitt et al., 2006; White, 1986).
Much past research has considered strategy as categorical, where each business unit’s
strategy could be considered to fall into one of the typology categories (Thornhill and White,
2007). In 1978, Miles and Snow suggested organization strategies to fall into the three main
domains of administrative, entrepreneurial, and technical. Based on these three domains, Miles
and Snow proposed four strategy typologies: a) prospector strategy, through which organizations
add to or change the products and services they offer; b) defender strategy, which refers to
maintaining a relatively stable subset of services; c) analyzer strategy, which represents
maintaining a stable subset while making periodical switches to new areas; and d) reactor
strategy, which was defined as lacking a consistent strategy (Shortell and Zajac, 1990). An
important conceptual position in Miles and Snow’s (1978) typology is the assumption that firms
are unable to be successful at simultaneously pursuing both the prospector and defender
strategies and that strategic inconsistency results in firms following the reactor strategy typology,
where performance is expected to be the lowest. However, Miles and Snow (1978) contend that
firms will be able to switch their strategy from prospector to defender and vice versa according
to their perception of the strategy that results in their best interests.

4.2.1 Generic Strategy Typologies
Porter (1980) proposed three generic strategies of which two (cost leadership and product
differentiation) targeted a broad market scope and the other (focus) corresponded to low target
market breadth. While it has been suggested that the integration of cost leadership and product
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differentiation strategies is possible to an extent (Porter, 1985, 1998) and sometimes even
necessary (Hill, 1988), the inherent limiting factors associated with each strategy often result in
business units pursuing variants of one of the two strategic directions. Porter (1980) has
suggested that cost leadership and product differentiation draw on assets and capabilities that are
contradictory and that this makes it very difficult to pursue both simultaneously at the business
unit level. Where cost leadership strategy “requires aggressive construction of efficient-scale
facilities, vigorous pursuit of cost reduction from experience, tight cost and overhead control,
avoidance of marginal customer accounts, and cost minimization in areas like R&D, service
sales force, and advertising” (Porter 1980: p. 35), product differentiation inherently faces tradeoffs with cost reduction in most areas. Most conceptual literature including the works of Porter
(1980, 1985) suggest that firms that attempt to pursue both cost leadership and differentiation
simultaneously will find themselves in a “stuck-in-the-middle” position where lower
performance is to be expected (Thornhill and White, 2007).
There have been conflicting findings in empirical research focusing on the link between
generic strategies and firm performance; some studies have found total commitment to one of the
generic strategies (purity) to be a source of higher performance, and some have found similar
results for hybrid strategies (Thornhill and White, 2007). Most theories have argued for strategic
purity to be associated with higher firm performance. There has been empirical support for this
claim when it comes to Porter’s proposed typologies. Thornhill and White (2007) found that in
three different industry types, firms that pursued strategic purity outperformed, or at least
equalled in performance, firms that followed a hybrid strategy. Some researchers have found that
the complexity of hybrid strategies and the difficulty of setting priorities when pursuing hybrid
strategies results in confusion and loss of direction, which in turn explains lower performance
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findings attributed to them (March, 1991; Treacy and Wiersema, 1995). This is a complexity that
some researchers have suggested to be manageable only through the adoption of matrix-like
structures that are both costly and difficult to manage (Miles and Snow, 1978).

4.2.2 Similarities and Distinctions of Strategy Typologies
There are broad similarities in general between most strategy typologies that have been
proposed by strategy researchers (Campbell-Hunt, 2000; Thornhill and White, 2007). For
example, “the central elements of an operational excellence, exploitation, defender, or cost
leadership strategy are cost, efficiency, reliability, refinement, and execution” (Thornhill and
White, 2007). However, the typologies that place more emphasis on learning or innovation such
as product leadership/customer intimacy (Tracey and Wiersema, 1997), exploration (March,
1991), prospector (Miles and Snow, 1978), and differentiation/non-price buyer value (Porter,
1980) have less convergence, while still sharing significant commonalities (Thornhill and White,
2007).
A major distinction between different typologies could be made on their position on
hybrid strategies or the ability of the same firm — at the business unit level — to pursue
distinctive strategy typologies. There is more similarity between typologies presented by more
process-oriented theorists such as March (1991) and Miles and Snow (1978), who have
considered the possibility of firms pursuing exploration and exploitation in sequence (March,
1991), or the analyzer type firms, which sequentially pursues prospector and defender strategies
(Miles and Snow, 1978). Process-oriented theories, however, note the scarcity of resources and
limitations in firms’ capabilities as factors impeding them in pursuing hybrid strategies. An
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important point in Miles and Snow’s (1978) approach is that they argue for balance through a
combination of the capabilities of two of the strategy typologies (prospector and defender) to
achieve the state where the analyzer strategy can be successfully pursued. However, Miles and
Snow (1978) have acknowledged the need for management’s close vigilance to maintain the
“delicate balance” that is required for firms to pursue the analyzer strategy type (Thornhill and
White, 2007). While the analyzer strategy type requires the firm to simultaneously possess the
capabilities of prospector and defender firms, Miles and Snow (1978) hesitate to argue for the
simultaneous pursuance of prospector and defender typologies, proposing only the sequential
approach to be feasible.
Several researchers have pointed to the similarities between Miles and Snow’s (1978)
proposed strategies and other strategy typologies. Other than Thornhill and White (2007), who
have suggested similarities between prospector strategy (Miles and Snow, 1978), differentiation
strategy (Porter, 1980), and exploration (March, 1991) and defender strategy (Miles and Snow,
1978), cost leadership (Porter, 1980), and exploitation (March, 1991), Menguc and Auh (2007)
have also suggested that firms pursuing a prospector strategy are also pursuing exploration, while
firms pursuing a defender strategy are also pursuing exploitation.
While there are similarities between different strategy typologies, they should not be
assumed to be entirely the same. Some of the differences between strategy categorizations have
revealed themselves through conflicting empirical findings. For example, while purity in
pursuing Porter’s generic strategies has been found to be associated with higher performance for
standalone business units (Thronhill and White, 2007), maintaining a balance between
exploration and exploitation has been found to have a similar effect for some types of businesses
(Uotila, Maula, Keil, and Zahra, 2009). The latter findings further emphasize previous theoretical
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propositions of the essential co-dependence of exploration and exploitation for one another,
despite their competition for scarce resources within organizations (March, 1963). Therefore,
while maintaining a degree of balance between exploration and exploitation, corporate business
units need to determine their intensity in following each approach. For instance, they need to
make decisions to either allocate resources more intensely to exploitative approaches resulting in
pursuing strategies of an operational excellence nature, or to maintain a more balanced approach,
taking a more creative path that could be more costly but could result in subsequent
differentiation from other competitors.

4.2.3 Operational Excellence
As mentioned earlier, a group of proposed typologies for business-level strategy can be
categorized under those that emphasize operational excellence in the business unit. Despite some
differences, strategic approaches such as cost leadership (Porter, 1980), defender (Miles and
Snow, 1978), and exploitation (March, 1963, 1991) can be considered to fit under the same
theoretical umbrella.
For the purpose of this dissertation, the emphasis has been placed on decisions made or
actions taken at the business unit level that are more in line with Porter’s (1980) cost leadership
strategy. Firms that pursue such a strategy are those that have a heavier emphasis on actions and
decisions that exploit the business unit’s existing resources and capabilities in order to achieve a
better competitive position relative to their rivals.
Firms that pursue exploitation to a higher degree and spend less of their resources on
exploration (i.e., cost leaders) are those that emphasize efficiency, reliability, refinement, and
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execution (Thornhill and White, 2007). This emphasis results in developing capabilities that
allow business units to produce and market their comparable products at efficiency levels higher
than their direct competitors (Porter, 1990). However, an excessive emphasis on exploitation
could result in the obsolescence of a business unit (March, 1991), while it should maintain a
certain degree of exploration to maintain competitive product quality in order to survive (Porter,
1990; Hill, 1988).

4.2.4 Product Leadership
Another group of business strategy typologies are those that emphasize achieving
superior performance through offering products or services to the market that are superior to
those of competitors. Product differentiators (Porter, 1980) and prospectors (Miles and Snow,
1978) are those that explore (March, 1991; Menguc and Auh, 2007) new ways to provide
superior products or services with more value to their customers (Porter, 1980). However,
businesses that pursue exploration often pursue exploitation to some degree in order to extract
rents that are generated as the result of their endeavours. Therefore, product leaders are also
those that take a more balanced approach when pursuing exploratory and exploitative strategies
(Gupta, Smith, and Shalley, 2003).
Exploration of new possibilities is often associated with experimentation and taking risks
(March, 1991), which in turn can result in concerted learning, innovation, and acquisition of new
sources of knowledge that are valuable (Baum, Li, and Usher, 2000; Gupta, Smith, and Shalley,
2006). The inherent risks that are associated with the exploratory activities necessary for product
leadership mean that higher costs and lower levels of efficiency will follow. The payoffs of
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pursuing exploration are often uncertain and results are yielded over extended periods of time
(Uotila et al., 2009). However, when successful, exploration can yield substantial competitive
advantages that provide opportunities for exploitation (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). This allow
firms to better encounter dynamism within their industries (Uotila et al., 2009), which is
particularly suited for businesses within high-technology industries (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1997).

4.3 Agency and Business Strategy
Strategic directions in businesses largely rely on the decisions that are made by the
executives in charge. In most businesses, this responsibility falls on the shoulders of the business
unit CEOs. In corporations, the corporate headquarters’ objective is to ensure that each business
unit’s strategic direction serves the best interests of the corporations. Therefore, control
mechanisms are put in place to ensure that the business unit achieves the objectives that are
desired by the corporation, and to compensate the business unit executives in charge on that
basis. While this approach has strong roots in the literature of agency theory (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989), it can also result in outcomes that are contrary to the
expectations of corporations. Failure to exercise appropriate control mechanisms can result in
business unit CEOs taking strategic directions and making decisions that do not necessarily serve
the best interests of the corporation. Therefore, the self-interest of the agent can also influence
the strategy pursued by business units.
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4.4 Business Strategy and Business Effects in Corporate Strategy Literature
While understanding the role of business strategy in business unit performance is
essential and has been of some interest to researchers, there is very little evidence that it has been
properly investigated in past research, and most researchers have focused on business effects
instead (e.g., McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Also, where business
strategy has been the focus, corporate-level influences other than controls have been included
(e.g., White, 1986). While business strategy focuses on the strategic orientation of a business unit
— namely, cost leadership or product differentiation — business effects include other explained
or unexplained factors as well. Some of these include business unit structure, control systems,
and reward systems. Therefore, to understand the influence of business strategy in business unit
performance, similar to the confusion surrounding the notions of corporate effects and corporate
strategy, there is the need to deconstruct the business effects variable and to distinguish business
strategy as one of its constituents.
The main reason for this gap resides in the limitations in acquiring empirical evidence
that simultaneously includes corporate-level and business-level factors. In addition, the task to
deconstruct either corporate effects and/or business effects often requires access to empirical
evidence that goes beyond data available in many publicly available sources. As a result, the
literature on strategic management lacks studies that focus on corporate strategy and business
strategy and often resorts to comparing the influence of corporate effects and business effects
and treating business effects exogenously.
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4.5 Corporate Controls and Business Strategy
As mentioned previously, there is a wide consensus among strategic management
researchers that business strategies that focus on capturing broader markets tend to vary along
the two generic types of product differentiation and cost leadership (Thornhill and White, 2007).
Also, as discussed earlier, the fundamental capabilities and resources that are required to pursue
any such strategies are assumed to be different to such a degree that it is believed that the
simultaneous pursuit of both strategies is not likely and that any attempt to join practices
corresponding to each type of strategy will result in firms ending up in a situation where they
will be “stuck in the middle,” failing to reap the performance advantages associated with any of
the strategies (Porter, 1980; Miles and Snow, 1978; Thornhill and White, 2007).
However, while the choice of business-level strategy has been attributed to many factors
such as industry effects, firm capabilities, and other idiosyncratic specifications, the effects
carried over from the parent corporation have often been neglected. This has resulted in some
research findings linking the performance of business units to strategies without considering the
precedence of corporate effect through implemented controls, and ruling out the significance of
corporate strategy or arguing for the effect to be extremely small (i.e., Bowman and Helfat,
2001; Schmalansee, 1985; McGahan and Porter, 1997).
Operational excellence strategies are those that focus on reducing all costs that relate to
the production or any other processes that a business unit is engaged with in order to increase
firm utility through an increase in the difference between the market value and production value
of the end product (Porter, 1990). Successful pursuance of a cost leadership strategy requires the
business to eliminate costs that are considered to be unnecessary and insignificant to the basic
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utility that the product is meant to provide the end user. Therefore, a cost leadership strategy is
often considered to be associated with a cost-cutting approach and increasing efficiencies in
production or any other process that exists before the product reaches the market (Thornhill and
White, 2007). Businesses that pursue cost leadership strategies are often capable of passing on a
portion of costs saved to the end users, which in turn enables them to capture larger segments of
the market that are more driven by price in making a product or service-selection decision. To
maintain the ability to reduce costs and remain competitive in the market, businesses tend to
build on the economies of scale that result from their larger market segments and which allow
them to reduce the costs of their own inputs (Hill, 1988). Also, such businesses tend to show
interest in innovation that would allow them to modify or alter their processes in such a manner
that results in lower costs of production and the maintenance of their position in the market as a
cost leader.
On the other hand, product leaders tend to create and capture value through producing
products or offering services that are distinctive when compared to other similar products or
services offered by their competitors in the market (Porter, 1980, 1990). Pursuing a product
differentiation strategy requires firms to create and develop distinctive features for their products
and services and to protect that distinctiveness through any existing mechanisms, or to explore
paths that lead to new distinctive features (March, 1991; Porter, 1980). To remain competitive in
the market, product differentiators tend to rely on their ability to innovate or incorporate
innovations into their products or services. Therefore, such companies will be more likely to
actively invest in R&D, knowledge acquisition, and any other type of investment that would
support their product distinctiveness in one way or another.
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The economic logic behind the product differentiation strategy allows firms to exploit the
additional value created for customers through charging a premium based on end users’
willingness to pay more for that additional value (Porter, 1980). Therefore, unlike cost leaders,
product differentiators tend not to be overly concerned with controlling their costs of production
but instead focus on their ability to create additional value and offering it to the market. To
pursue a product differentiation strategy successfully, incurring costs and making investments
that enable the firm to pursue and maintain an innovative mode through the exploration of new
opportunities is critical (Uotila et al., 2009). The inability of a product differentiator to maintain
its product or service distinctiveness or to create or find new ways to achieve another distinctive
position means that its offered product or service will start losing value, which will result in
lower competitiveness and subsequent lower performance (March, 1991).
In a multi-business firm, the corporate-level performance is prioritized over business unit
performance and therefore the CEO of each business unit is expected to make decisions or take
strategic actions that are in accordance with expectations at the corporate level. This expectation
at the corporate level is often driven by the individual performance of the business unit or, in
some cases, the contribution that the business unit makes to the overall corporate performance.
Corporate headquarters often make attempts to monitor the performance of senior managers at
their business units and design and implement mechanisms to ensure that expectations at the
corporate level are fulfilled by business unit managers or that the direction of decisions or
actions at the business unit level is aligned with such expectations. Control mechanisms
employed by corporate headquarters can entail compensation, limiting or extending latitude in
decision making, or in some cases removal of senior business unit managers from their positions.
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Therefore, strategic decisions and actions at the level of business units are influenced by control
mechanisms that have been put in place by the corporate headquarters. Consequently:

Hypothesis 5: The influence of corporate strategy on business strategy is
mediated through corporate controls.

The adoption of strategic controls requires the corporate headquarters to have qualitative
and in-depth assessments of the performance of the business unit CEO in order to properly
analyze decisions and actions and understand the underlying reasons behind each of them (Rowe
and Wright, 1997). Also, to implement strategic control mechanisms, the corporate headquarters
needs to consider the long-term impact of each decision and action and evaluate the effect of
each such action or decision on firm competitiveness and long-term performance. When a
business unit is subject to strategic monitoring and control from the corporate headquarters,
decisions or actions made at the business unit level are evaluated based on the different aspects
of their performance. This means that the business unit CEO will not be evaluated simply on the
basis of decisions or actions with immediate effect, but also based on the impact of those
decisions or actions on the business unit’s long-term performance and the effect that they may
have on the competitiveness of the business unit in its industry. However, this could also mean
that in some cases a business unit may not be considered as a simple profit or loss centre but as
part of the corporation that contributes to overall corporate performance through strategic actions
such as cross-subsidizing other business units and/or R&D activities.
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The nature of strategic controls allows business unit managers to make decisions or take
actions that could ensure firm competitiveness without the fear of potential variations in shortterm performance affecting their own individual interests (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994). As
mentioned previously, success in certain types of strategy such as product differentiation is very
unlikely unless the business is committed to making investments that lead to innovation or
distinctiveness of products or services compared to competitors. However, such investments that
seem critically necessary to the success of such a strategy will often appear to have negative
short-term effects on financial reports, as their objectives tend to take time before becoming
realized. While costs such as R&D, capital investment, and hiring a highly skilled and
knowledgeable workforce can negatively impact business units’ immediate financial
performance, executives of strategically controlled business units are more inclined to make such
decisions if they are certain of their long-term returns. The in-depth and qualitative monitoring
mechanism of strategic controls allows business unit managers to provide justifications for their
strategic decisions and actions without risking their personal individual interests. Similarly, they
will be able to make decisions to pursue cost leadership strategies should they see that this
strategy best fits with their business units’ highest long-term performance.
While strategic controls provide the senior management of business units with the
latitude of choice to pick the best strategies that they see for business unit long-term and shortterm performance, they also constrain the possibility of decisions that are not aligned with
overall corporate objectives to be made. The compensation mechanisms that are based on
strategic controls often seek to ensure business unit performance according to corporate
expectations through creating an alignment between the individual interests of the business unit’s
senior management and those of the corporation (Eisenhardt, 1985). The detailed and in-depth
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monitoring that is complementary to strategic controls allows for business unit senior
management to go beyond merely superficial financial and accounting indicators to justify
actions or decisions in the business unit without compromising their own interests.
On the other hand, business units that are subject to financial controls are those where the
corporate headquarters does not have the necessary means or capabilities to conduct qualitative
and in-depth analysis of the decisions and actions by the senior management business units or
those that belong to industries where the lack of environmental dynamism and static conditions
calls for very little, if any, strategic enactment (Hill and Hoskisson, 1987). When a corporate
headquarters fails or is unwilling to make qualitative assessments of the decisions or actions of
business unit senior managers and their underlying justifications, strategic implications, or longterm effects, and instead relies on numbers of financial indicators and accounting measures, then
the performance of the business unit senior management will be evaluated mostly on the basis of
immediate and short-term proxies of firm performance. In that case, senior management will be
evaluated on accounting measures that are incapable of demonstrating the strategic position of
the firm and how the firm will be performing over a more extended time period. Therefore,
business unit senior managers will be under pressure from corporate headquarters to make
decisions for actions that comply with the expectations of evaluation measures at the corporate
level.
As mentioned before, financial controls are often associated with the evaluation of
financial and accounting indicators compared to existing averages of the industry and historical
performance of the business unit. When financial controls are the dominant form of control that
is employed by a corporate headquarters, it is very likely that the senior management of a
business unit makes decisions that have the least negative impact on the performance measures
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that are most immediately affected as a result. The accounting and financial indicators that are
ordinarily the primary reference for financial controls are most positively affected when
decisions prior to the time of the report result in the elimination of costs and an increase in sales.
On the other hand, decisions that increase costs in the short run, regardless of their long-term
effects, will be displayed negatively on conventional financial reports.
When a senior manager is evaluated and subsequently compensated on the basis of
financial indicators, he or she will be receiving incentives to make decisions that avoid
investments with long-run payoffs in order to minimize damaging self-interest (Eisenhardt,
1985). Therefore, investments in R&D, capital, or knowledge acquisition through different
mechanisms that attenuate business units’ short-term financial performance will most likely be
avoided. Moreover, corporate headquarters that tend to rely on financial controls do not have the
means or desire to implement strategic controls that would provide justification for any such
investment. Conversely, these business unit senior managers are encouraged to pursue strategies
that are associated with cost control, cost cutting, quality control, efficient production, or any
such strategy that would positively affect business unit performance in the short term.
As mentioned previously, cost leadership strategy is often considered to be an operational
excellence strategy, associated with cost control, refinement, or any type of process innovation
that would increase efficiency (Porter, 1980; March, 1991). Business units that are controlled
through financial controls are often constrained from pursuing product differentiation strategies,
since they require significant investments in innovation, where returns are not necessarily
observable over shorter periods of time. However, as mentioned before, strategies that are similar
to cost leadership are more likely to be aligned with managerial preferences and corporate
expectations. Hence:
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Hypothesis 6: Business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic
controls are more likely to pursue product leadership strategies than business
units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls, while
business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls are
more likely to pursue operational excellence strategies than business units that
are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls.

4.6 Summary
Business strategy is perhaps the most central topic to the literature in the area of strategic
management, as it has been directly linked to performance, which is considered the focus of
interest of this area. To understand business strategy as a construct, many different
categorizations have been presented with differences in their economic theoretical foundations.
Most of these categorizations converge on similarities in their focus, which often fall into one of
two categories: operational excellence and product leadership.
The link between corporate strategy and business strategy has also been of interest to
researchers, although little consensus has been reached on its nature. While a degree of
ambiguity exists around the relationship, the relative significance of each level of strategy on the
performance of business units has been studied and often suggests that business unit strategy is
the more effective of the two in determining business unit performance. However, the role of
controls in linking the two levels of strategy has largely been ignored.
This chapter contends that the business unit strategy of wholly owned business units is
endogenous to strategies at the corporate level through the mediation of corporate controls.
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Drawing on the literature of agency theory, the arguments and hypotheses in this chapter suggest
that the exercise of strategic controls by corporations results in a higher tendency on the part of
business units to pursue product leadership strategies, while the exercise of financial controls by
corporate headquarters triggers the tendency in business units to pursue strategies of operational
excellence.
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CHAPTER 5: BUSINESS UNIT PERFORMANCE

5.1 Introduction
One of the aims of strategic management is to explore and understand the foundations of
business units’ superior performance over competitors within their related product markets.
Therefore, performance has revealed itself as perhaps the most significant and ultimate
dependent variable in most scholarly work in this area (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005;
Rowe and Morrow, 1999). Corporations and businesses alike seek to maximize their
performance and fulfil the economic justification for their existence. However, to measure
performance as a dependent variable there is a need to fully appreciate it as a unique construct, or
perhaps multiple interdependent constructs. This chapter’s aim is to provide a better
understanding of the construct of performance in order to properly establish its relationship with
business-level strategy. Also, drawing on past literature, in this section the role of controls that
are put in place by corporate headquarters in business units’ performance is investigated and
corresponding relationships are hypothesized.
Although performance has perhaps been the most widely accepted dependent variable in
the strategy literature, there is yet to be consensus among researchers on its nature. Many
conceptualizations of performance, although similar on the surface, differ in terms of time
horizon, stability, types of returns, focus on absolute versus expected versus relative returns, unit
of analysis, attributions to the firm versus industry versus luck, and so on (Glick, Washburn, and
Miller, 2005). However, theoretical perspectives that dominate the field of strategic management
(Barney, 1991; Porter, 1980) still emphasize performance as businesses’ ultimate objective and
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therefore it is still considered to be the “time test” of the success or failure of strategies that are
pursued (Schendel and Hofer, 1979).
In what follows, the attempt is made to provide a clearer theoretical understanding of
performance as a construct of interest in this dissertation. First, a review of the literature on
performance as a general construct is made. Subsequently, the similarities and distinctions in the
literature between short-term versus long-term performance and financial versus market
performance are examined. Once a clear understanding of the scope and nature of different
dimensions of performance has been reached, I proceed with a review of the existing literature
on the established links between strategy at the corporate level and the business unit level with
different dimensions of performance. The final section of this chapter focuses on establishing the
role of corporate controls in the successful execution of business unit strategies. Similar to the
concept of “fit” between macro controls and diversification, which has been proposed earlier in
the literature (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989), this dissertation emphasizes the significance of
“fit” between controls that are put in place by corporate headquarters and the strategies that are
pursued by executives at the business unit level and the effect of this “fit” on business unit
performance.

5.2 Performance as a Construct
Most literature in the area of strategic management has conceptualized firm performance
as one of three alternatives: uni-dimensional, multi-dimensional, and a collection of multiple
constructs covering a broad domain of empirically related and unrelated firm outcomes; although
the uni-dimensional approach has often been rejected by scholars as too simplistic (Glick,
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Washburn, and Miller, 2005). However, despite the consensus on the rejection of one alternative,
scholarship is yet to reach convergence over one form of conceptualization of the construct.
While performance has been a source of much debate, there has been little disagreement
over its connection to firm effectiveness (Glunk and Wilderon, 1996), which re-emphasizes the
multidimensional nature of firm performance. Such multiple dimensions have been suggested to
relate to a firm’s stakeholders, its competitive position, and the temporal frame of assessment of
performance in a business unit (Devinney, Richard, Yip, and Johnson, 2005). However, a
generally acceptable conceptualization of the construct has not been made, despite urgings by
some researchers in this area (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005).
Past research has identified three conceptually distinct types of performance dimensions
as financial and other accounting reports, market valuations, and key informant descriptions
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel, 1993). Furthermore, Rowe and Morrow (1999) have
identified the firm performance dimensions as reputation, market dimension, and financial
dimension. However, despite the recognition of performance as a multidimensional construct and
the identification of several corresponding dimensions, most strategy researchers take firm
financial performance as the core of the domain of possible dimensions (Venkatraman and
Ramanujam, 1986).

5.2.1 Financial Performance
In most literature on the construct of performance to date, the emphasis has been on the
financial and accounting performance of firms. Accounting reports dominated early research on
firm performance, with market-based performance becoming more popular by the mid-1980s
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(Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005; Hawawini, Subramaniam, and Verdin, 2003, Hoskisson et
al., 1993; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986).
Most criticism that has been directed towards the dominance of financial performance
measures has related to its failure to predict future firm performance. This has been the reason
why in the past decades more and more researchers have become interested in considering the
other dimensions of firm performance as being as important as the financial dimension. For
example, Meyer (2005) has criticized the use of cash flow as a measure of efficiency when
economic performance should in fact involve anticipation and promise. This shortcoming in the
financial dimension of firm performance is most evident in stock markets, when “the buy- and
sell-side analysts are surprised when stock prices show a persistent enhancement following a
firm’s announcement of intentions to buy back stock regardless of the firm’s subsequent failure
to follow through” (Westphal and Zajac, 1998) or “when researchers show that stock prices are
sensitive to the particular framing of adverse earnings announcements” (Hutton, Miller, and
Skinner, 2003).
Another criticism on placing too much importance on the accounting and financial
dimension of firm performance has been directed towards the nature of the accounting reports
themselves. This criticism has stated that accounting data are not straightforward, as
demonstrated by Arthur Andersen, Canary Capital Partners, and SEC regulators tracking mutual
fund breakpoint discounts (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005).
The operationalization of performance by strategic management researchers has typically
been done in terms of existing accounting ratios (e.g., ROA, ROS, ROE, ROI) or market-based
measures such as Sharpe’s measure, Treynor’s measure, Jensen’s alpha, and Tobin’s q (Rowe
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and Morrow, 1999; Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986). To estimate the level of financial
performance of a firm, both types of performance measures — financial and market — have
been used in past research (Rowe and Morrow, 1999). This has led some researchers to suggest
an “implicit consensus” between researchers on market performance and accounting
performance for the two dimensions of a firm’s financial performance (Rowe and Morrow,
1999).
There have also been some attempts to use subjective measures when operationalizing
firm financial performance (Rowe and Morrow, 1999; Cannella and Hambrick, 1993; Dess and
Robinson, 1984; Fryxell and Wang, 1994) as a possible third dimension.
Accounting-based measures of firm financial performance are the most popular in the
strategic management literature (Barney, 1997). The pros and cons of the popularity of
accounting-based measures give reasons for their popularity among strategy researchers.
According to Rowe and Morrow (1999), while cynics would suggest that the reason for the
popularity of accounting measures is that the data is easily available for publicly traded firms,
others contend that accounting numbers are important because managers use them when making
strategic decisions, and because they actually provide insights into economic rates of return
(Horowitz, 1984; Jacobson, 1987; Long and Ravenscraft, 1984). Rowe and Morrow (1999)
further suggest that the use of accounting-based measures is related to the relationship between
independent and dependent variables in firm performance. Moreover, it has been suggested that
accounting-based measures are most suitable to measure firms’ short-term performance, as they
refer to the current financial state of the firm (Rowe and Morrow, 1999).
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The use of accounting measures for firm performance has proven to be very acceptable
among strategy researchers in measuring firm performance. In studies that have focused on
retrenchment, which refers to the practice of eliminating unnecessary costs and assets that are not
productive (Lim, Celly, Morse, and Rowe, 2013), it has been noted that accounting measures
have been widely used by firms to measure whether the turnaround has been successful (Rowe
and Morrow, 1999). Some researchers have taken this as support for the validity of accountingbased measures as the measurement for firms’ short-term performance, particularly since
retrenchment has generally been found to yield short-lived effects (Rowe and Morrow, 1999;
Morrow, Busenitz, and Johnson, 1997).

5.2.2 Market Performance
Another dimension of the performance of a firm is the market value associated with the
organization. Although widely accepted as one of the dimensions of firm financial performance,
market value has not been as popular as accounting-based measures. This has been the case
particularly with market analysts, who have taken issue with market value as a measure of
performance that has roots in both the present and the future (Glick, Washburn, and Miller,
2005), making identification of its sources and the significance of those sources very difficult.
Since the 1980s there has been an increasing tendency towards using market-based
dimensions as a more appropriate dimension of a firm’s performance. This can be seen in the
work of many strategy researchers in later years, as strategy researchers have begun to rely on
market-based measures of performance, either alone or in conjunction with accounting-based
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measures, when assessing a firm’s financial performance (Rowe and Morrow, 1999; Hoskisson,
Hitt, Johnson, and Moesel, 1993; Hoskisson, Johnson, and Moesel, 1994).
The appropriateness of market value as a strong dimension of firm financial performance
has also been a subject for debate. This is due to its reliance on information other than archival
sources, which are not entirely objective. Therefore, some researchers have suggested a firm’s
market value to be only appropriate as a starting point, but not an entirely reliable measure to go
forward on (Glick, Washburn, and Miller, 2005).
Rowe and Morrow (1999), based on the research done by Bentson (1982), Fisher and
McGowan (1983), and Watts and Zimmerman (1978 and 1990), concluded that the increase in
the use of market-based measures of firm performance was partly in response to microcomputers becoming more available, making calculations of market-based measures easier, and
partly because of the criticisms that have been voiced toward the excessive use of accountingbased measures. The theoretical basis of this approach was also suggested to be the result of
market-based measures’ higher ability to reflect a firm’s current and future financial performance
(Rowe and Morrow, 1999).
Seth (1990) has noted that there is a major difference between the accounting-based
measure and the market-based measures. He notes that “market-based measures are intrinsically
different from accounting-based measures because market-based measures focus on the present
value of future streams of income, whereas accounting-based measures focus on past
performance.”
While sales and growth in sales have generally been understood as accounting measures
for performance, they do not represent the profitability of a firm. Firms with higher costs of
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production and lower price offerings are able to extract less value from the market (Barney and
Peteraf, 1993). However, growth in sales, under certain conditions, can also represent a relative
gain in market share, which has been considered as a dimension of market performance.
Therefore, past research has focused on growth in sales as an indication of firm market
performance (White, 1986).

5.3 Corporate Performance and Business Performance
Corporate performance is assessed on the basis of the value that is created as the result of
the operations of a firm’s multiple business units and as a consequence of their aggregate
performance. With the emergence of corporations with multiple businesses, the assessment of
performance at the corporate level and the business unit level has become of interest to many
researchers (Bowman and Helfat, 2001). However, differences in strategies that are pursued at
the corporate level have resulted in differences in value-creation mechanisms. While related
diversified corporations make every attempt to leverage economies of scope that result from
shared activities to create synergistic value (Teece, 1982; Hoskisson, 1987), unrelated diversified
firms should count on the individual performance of each of their business units.
The presence of corporations in multiple product markets has made it extremely difficult
for strategy researchers to make performance assessments at the corporate level using
dimensions other than financial performance. This can be found in the overwhelming tendency to
measure performance at the business level when conducting research on the relationship between
corporate strategy and performance (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997;
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Bowman and Helfat, 2001). This dissertation takes a similar approach, conducting performance
analysis at the business unit level.

5.4 Business Strategy and Business Performance
The relationship between business strategy and business performance is one of the bestestablished relationships in the strategic management literature. Past theoretical work has
suggested that firms can achieve superior competitive positions over their direct rivals through
committing themselves to pursuing certain strategic orientations (Porter, 1980). There have been
different positions taken by researchers on the feasibility of combining more than one strategic
orientation in order to achieve a competitive advantage. While some have argued for this
possibility (Miles and Snow, 1978; Hill, 1988), others have taken strong positions against it
(Porter, 1980).
Past empirical research has often made attempts to measure the business-related effects
compared to other existing effects that influence business-level performance (Bowman and
Helfat, 2001). Most studies have shown business-level effects, industry effects, and corporate
effects to be the most influential in defining the success or failure of a single business unit
(Rumelt, 1991; Carroll, 1993; Ghemawat, 1994; Ghemawat and Ricart Costa, 1993; Hoskisson,
Kim, and Hill, 1993; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Later empirical studies have found certain
categories of strategy to be mutually exclusive (Thornhill and White, 2007), and others to be
strongly dependent on one another in generating superior performance (Uotila et al., 2009).
However, while there has been much done to establish the link between business-level strategy
and business-level performance, there has been little done to understand the role that corporate
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controls play in defining the relationship. This shortcoming partly relates to the negligence of
controls in defining business-level strategy and the consideration of business unit strategy as an
exogenous factor. Therefore, the significance of a “fit” between the controls implemented by the
corporation on business units and business unit strategy remains mainly unexplored.

5.5 Fit Between Business Strategy and Corporate Controls
Performance at the business level of a business unit not only depends on the strategic
orientation of the business unit, but also on the “fit” between different organizational factors that
can have effects on business unit performance. The concept of “fit,” which was initially
developed in behavioural organizational research (Venkatraman, 1989), has also been used to
explain the relationship between corporate controls and the practices that are exercised at the
micro level of business units (Rowe and Wright, 1997; White, 1986). Such arguments suggest
that in order to maintain efficiency in business units and achieve superior performance, microlevel practices must conform to the requirements of controls at the macro level. This results in
the relationship between a corporate headquarters and a business unit affecting the business
unit’s subsequent performance. Past research has found a fit between business unit strategy and
the internal organization of the corporation to influence business unit performance, where higher
business unit autonomy leads to market performance (i.e., growth in sales) and less autonomy,
and tighter controls leads to higher short-term financial performance (White, 1986).
When a business unit is subject to financial controls, divergence from practices that have
a fit with an operational excellence strategy can result in the occurrence of a misfit between
corporate controls and practices at the business level (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Rowe and
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Wright, 1997; White, 1986). Such divergence, in turn, can result in the initiation of a conflict
between the business unit and its corporate parent. The resulting conflict can often be an
antecedent to variations in a firm’s financial performance during a shorter time period and the
inability of mutual communication of decision justification between the business unit and the
corporate headquarters. This lack of communication could subsequently affect the willingness of
the corporate headquarters to allocate additional resources or to leverage its corporate resources
to the advantage of the business unit.
Also, when a firm is pursuing a product differentiation strategy, its costs can often be
reduced through synergies that are created as a result of economies of scope within the
corporation. In unrelated diversified corporations, where financial controls are the primary
means of managing business units (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989; Goold, Campbell, and
Alexander, 1994), the lack of existence of such relationships can result in a misfit between
micro-level practices and macro-level controls (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1989). Such a misfit
can often result in less competitiveness at the business unit level and subsequent lower business
unit performance. Therefore, business unit performance subsequent to the choice of strategy can
also be affected by controls associated with different corporate strategies. Hence:

Hypothesis 7a: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit
and the corporate controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent financial
performance; business units pursuing operational excellence strategies will
exhibit higher financial performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on
financial controls, and business units pursuing product leadership strategies
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will exhibit higher financial performance when subject to a stronger emphasis
on strategic controls.
Hypothesis 7b: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit
and the corporate controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent market
share performance; business units pursuing operational excellence strategies
will exhibit higher market share performance when subject to a stronger
emphasis on financial controls, and business units pursuing product leadership
strategies will exhibit higher market share performance when subject to a
stronger emphasis on strategic controls.

5.6 Summary
Performance has often been the dependent variable of interest in the literature of strategic
management. Much research has been conducted to determine the relationships between various
organizational factors and business unit performance. The influence of corporate effects on
business performance, however, has largely remained unclear and subject to debate. Meanwhile,
differences in business unit strategy have been found to explain a significant part of variance in
business unit performance (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007; McGahan and Porter, 1997).
The role of “fit,” however, between corporate factors and business strategy has not fully
been addressed in past literature. Despite some researchers pointing to fit between other
organizational factors (Rowe and Wright, 1997), this notion has not been considered for
business strategy. In this chapter, it has been argued that the performance of a business unit has a
strong connection to the fit between corporate controls and business unit strategy. This means
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that businesses pursuing product leadership strategies have a better chance of achieving superior
performance if they are subject to strategic controls, instead of financial ones.
In this chapter, a review of the literature on performance was conducted. Since this
construct has often been questioned on validity, different perspectives on two main dimensions
of this construct — financial performance and market performance — have been reviewed.
Subsequently, arguments to support the proposed hypotheses were advanced.
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CHAPTER 6: METHODOLOGY AND DATA

6.1 Theoretical and Methodological Approach
Understanding the effect of corporate strategy on business unit performance has been
found to be more complex than initially expected. Hence, methodological differences in
assessing the relationship have been diverse, resulting in findings that have been conflicting at
times (e.g., Rumelt, 1974, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Some
of the differences in results have stemmed from differences in the conceptualization of the
relationship, while others have been founded on methodological dissimilarities (Hoskisson and
Hitt, 1990).
This dissertation has made an attempt to address the relationship at both levels. The
theoretical model that has been proposed in previous chapters puts forward a new theoretical
conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy — instead of corporate effects
— and business strategy, and subsequently business unit performance. The proposed model of
this dissertation posits that corporate strategy influences strategy at each business unit through
controls that are implemented for each business unit. Therefore, this dissertation conceptualizes
business unit strategy not as nested within corporate effects or as separate from corporate effects,
but as influenced by corporate strategy. This dissertation also unpacks the corporate effects
construct, theorizing the indirect link between corporate strategy — as part of the corporate
effect’s construct — and business unit strategy. In doing so, the theoretical representation of the
relationship acknowledges the mediating role of corporate controls within the proposed
relationship, while accounting for the moderating effects of three corporate variables: number of
business units, size of corporate headquarters staff, and background of the corporation’s CEO.
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However, the contributions of this dissertation are not limited to the conceptualization of
this phenomenon, but also include measurements of corporate controls, which had remained a
theoretical concept without operationalization in previous research.
The philosophical approach in this study is one that is deductive, where the theoretical
conceptualization of the phenomenon has been conducted by the researcher and the data is
collected and analyzed in order to ensure the falsifiability of the proposed theory. The result of
this dissertation is a theoretical perspective that extends previous theoretical conceptualizations
of the phenomenon of the influence of corporate strategy on business unit strategy, which was
still falsifiable and could be subject to further empirical testing.

6.2 Quantitative Sample and Data Collection
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this dissertation entails analysis of quantitative data
collected through archival secondary sources. Therefore, an important component of this
dissertation and its findings rely on measures that are used to operationalize the variables that are
included within the theoretical model. Previous methodological approaches in research on
corporate strategy have often resulted in the utilization of dichotomous variables, which have
resulted in misconceptions, particularly where boundary conditions within categories were
present (e.g., Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; Hough, 2006; Rumelt, 1974). The methodological
approach that has been applied in this dissertation has made every attempt to transform existing
categorical variables into ones that are continuous without violating previous conceptualizations,
while maintaining validity (Schwab, 1980) and relevance (Nagle, 1953). Such variables include
those that are used to determine the corporate strategy pursued by the corporations; corporate
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controls that are designed and implemented by the corporate headquarters and at the business
level; and strategies that are pursued at the level of the business unit. Using continuous variables,
the statistical analysis is conducted through ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Cohen and
Cohen, 1983; Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken, 2003). In what follows, the methodological
approach to measure and utilize each of the variables included in the model is reviewed in brief.
The data that is used for this dissertation comes from reports that have been developed by
the Industrial Development and Renovation Organization of Iran (IDRO). IDRO, which was
established in 1967, serves as the responsible entity that oversees industrial development in
Iranian organizations. IDRO provides services to many Iranian private and public sector
organizations. As of 2009, it has also owned and operated 290 major Iranian corporations, after
having privatized over 140 other corporations in the preceding years. It still remains Iran’s
largest and most influential industrial entity. This study uses data from 193 corporations under
IDRO’s umbrella, either owned by IDRO itself or subscribing to its services. The dataset also
includes data from 2,704 business units or divisions that operate under these 193 corporations.
To ensure that the effect of exogenous influences on observed variables remains minimal, data
from the years 1998 to 2000 have been included in the sample. This decision ensures that the
period falls within one single presidential administration period following the 1997 election. The
decision to limit the data to 2000 was to avoid possible influences resulting from consequences
of terrorist events of September 2001 on the observed performance variables.
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6.2.1 Corporate Strategy
To study the effect of corporate strategy on other organizational factors, it is necessary to
present appropriate measures for the variable. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, a comprehensive
review of the literature on corporate strategy was conducted. The concept of corporate strategy
that is discussed in this dissertation revolves around the approaches that corporations have
towards diversification. In this section, measures that are used for the purpose of this dissertation
are briefly discussed.
Traditional approaches in research on corporate strategy have often utilized Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes to measure the corporate strategy that is pursued (Hoskisson
and Hitt, 1990). However, research on the subject evolved to adopt categorical approaches in
determining corporate strategy, assuming market structure to be a more salient factor in
influencing firm performance than the strategies that are pursued at a corporate level (Hoskisson
and Hitt, 1990).
As mentioned earlier, the measurement of diversification strategy that is pursued by
corporations has evolved a great deal over time. One of the earliest measurement approaches
used a simple count of industries that corporations operated in, their specialization ratio, and an
interaction between these two factors to develop a measure of diversification (Gort, 1962).
Further developing this approach, Arnould (1969) also accounted for the share of corporations’
output within each of the industries in which they had a presence, as well as the concentration
measure of each industry. However, the uni-dimensionality inherent within such measurements
of diversification resulted in the development of other measures for diversification in
corporations. Most notable of such measures has been Rumelt’s (1974) categorical approach
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towards diversification, which extends Wrigly’s (1970) initial classification, proposing nine and
later seven categories for diversification.
It has been suggested that the main difference between Rumelt’s (1974)
operationalization and previously developed measures (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969) exists in
the categorical approach taken by Rumelt. This approach uses careful conceptualization of the
phenomenon, operationalizing corporate strategy through subjective and objective observations
and data instead of the continuous measures used by others (e.g., Gort, 1962; Arnould, 1969),
where simple objective and uni-dimensional information is used (Montgomery, 1982). However,
despite minor relative advantages over one another and under certain circumstances, empirical
findings of research using each of these different approaches have often yielded similar results
(Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990).
While past measures of diversification did serve the objective of measuring the degree of
diversification, they did not distinguish between different diversification strategies that are
pursued by firms. Most notably, they failed to measure the variation in relatedness, or
unrelatedness, of business units across corporations. To address this shortcoming, Jacquemin and
Berry (1979) developed an entropy measure for diversification.
The entropy measure of diversification not only measures the degree of diversification,
but also the degree to which the business units are related. The entropy measure provides its
output in the form of three separate indices: index of related diversification (DR), index of
unrelated diversification (DU), and index of total diversification (DT=DR+DU) (Palepu, 1985).
Since this approach provides the researcher with the ability to make the distinction between
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corporate strategies, it is used in this dissertation with certain modifications in order to
accommodate this dissertation’s methodological approach.
As indicated, the entropy measure for diversification provides three separate indices that
are often used by researchers as dichotomous variables, when analyzing the data. This often
results in the loss of valuable information in the presence of boundary conditions. To avoid this
loss and to provide a continuous measure for the analysis of data in this dissertation, consistent
with the approach validated and used in past research (Markides, 1995; Hoskisson and Johnson,
1992), a new measure is defined by dividing the related diversification index (DR) by the total
diversification index (DT). Since DT is the sum of DR and DU, it implicitly carries the value of
DU. Therefore, the new measure provides a measure that not only incorporates DR, but also DU.
Subsequently, to make comparison possible, the Z-scores for the newly developed variable are
utilized, after summation of a constant to avoid the possibility of negative values. The new
measure (DRZ) is then used as the continuous measure for corporate strategy in this dissertation,
with lower DRZ being unrelated diversification and higher DRZ being related diversification.

6.2.2 Span of Corporation
As discussed in Chapter 4, the ability of a corporation to implement its corporate controls
in business units is moderated by the number of businesses or product segments that its business
units are involved in. Earlier measures of diversification have often used simple counts of
business units in order to determine the level of firms’ diversification (e.g., Gort, 1962). To
measure the span of a corporation, a similar approach is taken in this dissertation and after
appropriate controls that are discussed later, the number of business units — i.e., wholly owned
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subsidiaries of the corporation with distinct legal and organizational identities and with profit
and loss reporting mechanisms — that form the corporation is used as the measure for this
variable.

6.2.3 Relevant Experience of the CEO
As previously argued, the CEO of a parent company is considered to hold primary
responsibility for corporate performance. Therefore, the CEO has the role of the ultimate
decision maker within a corporation. Building on findings of the upper echelons theory
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984), this dissertation also measures parent companies’ CEOs’ expertise
on the basis of past involvement as directors of businesses with industry classifications similar to
those of the focal corporations. In addition, the educational background of each individual CEO
is assessed to understand if it is relevant to each of the business units of the corporation.
To collect data for this measure, existing data from the CEO backgrounds of Iranian
corporations that subscribe to the services of Industrial Development and Renovation
Organization of Iran is used. The data, which has been provided through organizational archives,
is based on the educational backgrounds and employment histories of CEOs that manage IDROsponsored corporations.
To operationalize this variable, a measure has been developed for each business unit of
the corporation. For each business unit, individual CEOs of the corporation with experience
and/or educational history relevant to the industry of the business unit are coded as “1,” while
those with no prior experience or education related to that business unit are coded as “0.”
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6.2.4 Size of Corporate Headquarters
As one of the moderating variables of the theoretical model of this dissertation refers to
the size of the corporate headquarters, a similar approach to that taken by Kroll, Walters, and
Wright (2008) is adopted, where a simple count of the number of staff that forms the corporate
headquarters is used.

6.2.5 Corporate Controls
Corporate controls are put in place by corporations in order to ensure that the decisions
made and actions taken at the level of business units are in line with what is perceived to be in
the best interests of the corporation. The best interests of the corporation, as explained earlier in
this dissertation, are assessed on the basis of meeting short-term and long-term economic
objectives. The main responsibility for making decisions at the level of a business unit largely
lies with the highest-ranking executive in that business unit. Therefore, it is logical to assume
that corporate controls are one of the most effective tools employed by corporate headquarters to
influence the behaviour of their business units’ CEOs.
Corporate controls are important means for organizations to ensure that the performance
of business units are in accordance with predefined expectations. Past research has focused on
the level of autonomy that has been provided to different organizational units (e.g., White, 1986;
Vancil, 1979) or to the organizational levers that facilitate control (Simons, 1994). The degree of
autonomy represents the degree to which an organization allows for latitude in decisions to be
made in a more decentralized manner by executives in charge of different business units.
However, unless methods of evaluating performance are identified, the degree of autonomy
alone is not indicative of the type of control that is exercised in a corporation. An implication of
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the performance of business units as the focal point of interest by practitioners and researchers is
the prominence of diagnostic systems in conducting evaluations. Building on past research, this
study uses data from business units of Iranian corporations to capture characteristics such as
autonomy, horizontal interaction between business units, locus of decision making, and focus of
performance evaluation.
To operationalize the measure for corporate controls, retrospective data collected by
IDRO on Iranian corporations subscribing to its services and licensing is used for the years
between 1998 and 2000. The data, which are retrospective in nature, have been collected through
surveys using a 7-point Likert scale from business unit managers. The surveys contain items
such as “level of interaction between divisions,” “level of interaction between business units and
the corporate headquarters,” “degree of resource sharing between business units and divisions,”
“degree of capability sharing and transfer among divisions,” “level of information sharing,”
“level of knowledge by corporate managers regarding processes of business units,” “willingness
to accept risk in favour of long-term performance,” “spending on R&D, employee training,
capital and equipment, and market research,” “level of emphasis on monitoring
market/operational/financial data,” “degree of openness in communication between corporate
and division managers,” “method of performance evaluation for employees,” “level of emphasis
on cost reduction,” “use of financial data as the criterion for performance,” “degree of
competition among divisions,” and “degree of focus on short-term ROI, cash flow, revenue
growth, and market share as the criteria for evaluating performance” (Hitt, Ireland, Hoskisson,
Rowe, and Sheppard, 2006). This data captures different aspects of corporate controls such as
autonomy, diagnostics, and ongoing processes within a corporation, which is consistent with
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dimensions previously identified and proposed in past literature (e.g., Gonvidarajan and Fisher,
1990; Hoskisson and Hitt, 1988; White, 1986; Vancil, 1979).
In order to validate the measure for corporate controls, the data from business units is
split in half and exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is conducted on one half of the data to identify
emerging factors. Since the sample size is larger than 300, factor loadings greater than 0.4 are
considered as acceptable. As expected, survey items emphasizing approaches such as
“interaction among business units,” “interaction with corporate headquarters,” and “resource
sharing with other business units” load highly on the strategic controls factor. Those with
emphasis on approaches such as “risk avoidance” and “financial evaluation of performance” load
higher on the financial controls factor. Then, the items for emerging factors are checked against
existing definitions for each type of control such as strategic controls and financial controls. The
averages of items are then used to develop new measures for strategic controls and financial
controls.
To develop a unique variable that captures both types of controls, the ratio of the
developed measures is used; the measure for strategic controls is divided by the measure of
financial controls. The ratio is standardized and centred before being used. The developed
measure captures both types of controls. Higher values indicate a stronger emphasis on strategic
controls and lower values signal a stronger emphasis on financial controls. This variable is
measured for every business unit, and varies for each of the business units within a corporation.
The summary of factor loadings for items measuring controls has been included in Table 6.1.
As mentioned, the sums of items from emerging factors are used to construct two new
factors: strategic controls and financial controls. The alpha value for strategic controls is 0.71
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and for financial controls is 0.76. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is then performed to test
for distinctiveness and uni-dimensionality of the factors, which reveals a GFI=0.941 and a Chisquare value of 925.51. Convergent validity is checked (CV>0.5) for with CV (ξStrategic
Controls)=0.502

and CV (ξFinancial Controls)=0.56. The discriminant validity of the controls variable is

also checked. With covariance set at 1, the analysis reveals a worsening in fit, which
demonstrates that the unconstrained model has a better fit. This fulfills the discriminant validity
criterion for controls.
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Table 6.1: Factor Loadings for Controls

Item
Interaction among divisions
Interaction with corporate HQ
Sharing resources among divisions
Transfer of core competencies among
divisions
Information sharing among divisions
R&D expenditures
Management training
Market research
Open communication between corporate and
division
Employee evaluation based on financial
results
Least cost behaviour
Risk avoidance
Competition among divisions
Focus on ROI
Capital channelled to higher financial
performers

Factors
Strategic Controls
Financial Controls
-0.031
0.639
0.004
0.631
-0.038
0.612
-0.033
0.402
0.399
0.384
0.327
0.295
0.139

-0.042
-0.013
-0.008
-0.018
-0.004

0.073

0.872

-0.037
0.043
-0.114
-0.002
-0.024

0.592
0.379
0.363
0.252
0.201

Note: Items in bold have been used to construct the corporate controls measure.
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6.2.6 Business Strategy
There have been many methods proposed for determining or measuring business-level
strategies. To measure business unit strategy, this dissertation builds on Thornhill and White’s
(2007) research. Using the data collected by IDRO on organizations that have subscribed to its
services and licensing, this dissertation uses the 14 items that have been used to distinguish
business strategy for each of the business units.
The data collected by IDRO was collected using surveys with responses provided by
business unit managers. The 14 items on the survey are similar to those on the Canadian
Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) and include items such as “undertaking research and
development,” “developing new products/services,” “developing new production/operating
techniques,” “expanding into new geographic markets,” “total quality management,” “improving
product/service quality,” “reducing labour costs,” “using more part-time, temporary, or contract
workers,” “reducing other operating costs,” “reorganizing the work process,” “enhancing labour
management

cooperation,”

“increasing

employees’

skills,”

“increasing

employees’

involvement/participation,” “improving coordination with customers and suppliers,” and
“improving measures of performance.”
Similar to the method pursued by Thornhill and White (2007), exploratory factor
analysis, followed by confirmatory factor analysis, is conducted to identify distinct strategy
factors for one half of the data set, and to construct two factors using the sum of values for their
items. Since the sample size is larger than 300, factor loadings greater than 0.4 are considered
acceptable. The alpha values for the two constructed factors — product leadership and
operational excellence — are 0.79 and 0.70, respectively. As expected, items focusing on
dimensions such as “R&D investment” and “development of new products or services” load
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highly on the product leadership factor, while items emphasizing “reducing operating costs,”
“reducing labour costs,” or “improving production techniques” load highly on operational
excellence. The summary of factor loadings for the items used to measure business unit strategy
has been included in Table 6.2.
Confirmatory factor analysis is undertaken to identify the factors as distinct. The analysis
also reveals that both operation excellence and product leadership meet the requirements for
convergent validity (CV>0.5), with CV (ξOperational Excellence)=0.51 and CV (ξ

Product Leadership)=0.69.

The discriminant validity of the business unit strategy variable is also checked. With covariance
set at 1, the analysis reveals a worsening in fit, which demonstrates the unconstrained model to
have a better fit. This fulfills the discriminant validity criterion for business unit strategy.
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Table 6.2 Factor Loadings for Business Unit Strategy

Factors
Item

Operational
Excellence
-0.287
-0.332
0.811

Undertaking R&D
Developing new products/services
Developing new production/operating
techniques
Expanding into new geographic markets
Total quality management
Improving product/service quality
Reducing labour costs
Using more part-time, temporary contract
workers
Reducing other operating costs
Reorganizing the work process
Enhancing labour management cooperation
Increasing employee skills
Increasing employee
involvement/participation
Improving coordination with customers and
suppliers
Improving measures of performance

Product Leadership
0.845
0.820
-0.337

0.103
0.423
0.029
0.831
0.545

0.255
0.144
0.010
-0.352
-0.2156

0.752
0.354
0.072
-0.125
0.223

-0.344
0.012
0.112
0.331
0.023

0.312

0.361

0.451

0.314

Note: Items in bold have been used to construct the business unit strategy measure.
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6.2.7 Financial Performance
The measurement of financial performance in the majority of past research has been done
through financial and accounting indicators. The most commonly used measures for financial
performance in past research have been ROA, ROE, and ROI (Glick, Washburn, and Miller,
2005). In line with past research, I also adopt a similar approach, using ROI as the measure for
financial performance of the firm. The reason to choose ROI over ROA and ROE is solely based
on the availability of data. The calculation of ROI, expressed as a percentage, is done internally
within IDRO and is based on the following ratio:

 

Net pro it after interest and tax
Total investment assets

To account for the temporal element in the relationship between business strategy and
firm financial performance, the accounting measures from the subsequent year to the
measurement of business strategy are employed. The data that is required for this variable is
collected through the sections of annual reports of the IDRO-sponsored corporations that
explicate annual ROI for each business unit.

6.2.8 Market Performance
Unlike the case for financial performance, measuring market performance is not as
simple for wholly owned business units. There have been different measures proposed for the
measurement of market performance in past literature. Such measures have included Sharp’s

108

measure, Treynor’s measure, the appraisal ratio (Alexander and Francis, 1986; Bodie, Kane, and
Marcus, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 1994; Rowe and Morrow, 1999), and Tobin’s Q (Devinney et al.,
2005).
However, due to limitations on obtaining data on market indicators that relate to wholly
owned business units, it is difficult to estimate their market performance through any of the
market performance measures that are available. Therefore, in line with past research (White,
1986), growth in sales is used to measure the market performance of each business unit. To
obtain this measure, the revenue of each business unit is assessed compared to the total revenues
generated in the subsequent year, and the ratio from t-1 to t (the subsequent year to measuring
business strategy) is used to measure the market performance of the firm.

6.2.9 Control Variables
Several variables have been controlled for during data analysis for this dissertation. The
control variables include those at both the corporate and the business levels. In what follows, a
description of the control variables and the justification for their selection are provided.

6.2.9.1 Business-level Control Variables
Size of Business Units
Business units that are too small in size are controlled, since they do not engage much of
the information processing capacity of the corporate headquarters and would only inflate the
ability of the corporate directors to monitor their business units. To operationalize this control,
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two steps are taken. First, consistent with the European Union’s (EU) definition of small
businesses, business units with less than 50 members are eliminated from the dataset. The
selection of the EU standard is made due to its acceptance as an appropriate definition by IDRO.
For the remaining business units, the logarithm of the number of employees from each business
unit is used.

Industry Effects
Industry effects have also been controlled. Industry effects refer to industry-level
influences that lead to explained or unexplained business-unit-level effects. Industry effects may
have complex effects on the performance of business units and on the logic through which they
operate. As a result, industry effects are controlled for to avoid complications in the validity of
my findings. To complete this dissertation, industry effects (i.e., the membership of business
units in their respective industry sectors) have been controlled for for each of the business units
of corporations. The dataset used in this dissertation consists of business units that belong to 33
different industries.
To operationalize the control of industry effects, dummy variables corresponding to the
number of industries are used. To include industry effects within the correlation matrix, the
structural model for this dissertation is constructed within the SmartPLS environment and a
latent variable for industry effects is created. Then, the influence of industry effects on other
dependent variables is included in order to operationalize the control variable. The resulting
effect is included in the correlation matrix.
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6.2.9.2 Corporate-level Control Variables
Family Structure
Another variable that is controlled in this study is corporations with family structures.
Although many such corporations experience similarities in issues related to the management
and control of their businesses, they undermine some of the underlying logic within agency
theory literature (Zahra, 2003; Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997) which stands as an
important theoretical foundation of this dissertation. Therefore, every attempt is made to control
for such corporations in the analysis of the data. To operationalize family structure as a control
variable, a dummy variable is used (1=non-family structure and 0=family structure).
Corporations with boards of directors consisting of 50% or more first-degree (i.e., parents and
grandparents; brothers and sisters) or second-degree relatives (i.e., first and second cousins; inlaws) are identified as corporations with family structures. The data for this variable is provided
by IDRO within the dataset.

IDRO Ownership
While the majority of corporations included in this study are only subscribers to IDRO’s
licensing and services, there are instances where IDRO takes the role of the institutional owner
of the corporation and its business units. Although IDRO-owned corporations are still operated
and evaluated based on profit or loss, the nature of their interactions with IDRO and their
ownership structure result in complexities that go beyond what is generally the case for private
or public companies. Therefore, to eliminate the threat of effects from such complexities, IDRO
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ownership is controlled for throughout the dataset. A dummy variable is used to capture
ownership of the corporation by IDRO (1=non-IDRO ownership and 0=IDRO ownership).

Geographic Dispersion
Corporations with business units in different countries are controlled for to avoid
possible influences that exist because of the limitations of the corporate parent to implement and
execute its desirable controls. To operationalize geographic dispersion as a control variable, a
dummy variable is included in the dataset, which indicates if a corporation owns and operates a
business unit with over 50 employees outside of Iran’s borders (0=international expansion and
1=non-international expansion).

Corporate Effects
To avoid complications resulting from corporate-level influences other than corporate
strategy, corporate effects have been included as a control variable. Corporate effects include
factors such as structure and reward systems, among other less identified corporate-level factors.
Therefore, to avoid positive or negative influences on business-unit-level variables, which could
affect the validity of findings, corporate effects have been controlled for in this study. To
operationalize corporate effects as a control variable, a similar approach to industry effects is
used: 193 dummy variables, which corresponds to the number of corporations, are used to
connect each business unit to its corporate parent. To include corporate effects within the
correlation matrix, the structural model for this dissertation is constructed within the SmartPLS
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environment and a latent variable for corporate effects is created. Then, the influence of
corporate effects on other dependent variables is included in order to operationalize the control
variable. The resulting effect is included in the correlation matrix.

6.3 Summary
In this chapter, a detailed description was provided of the methodology used for the
measurement of variables included in this dissertation’s theoretical model. The sources for data
used in this research were also explained and discussed in detail. In addition to the main
variables, control variables were also discussed for justification. In what follows in Chapter 7,
the results and findings from analysis of the hypothesized relationships will be presented. Then,
findings from Chapter 7 will be discussed in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the results of the statistical analysis of the dataset used for this dissertation
are presented. To maintain clarity of the process, the results have been presented on a
hypothesis-to-hypothesis basis. The methods used for the analysis consist of linear regression
and analysis of variance (ANOVA) techniques. For the analysis related to each hypothesis, the
quantitative findings have been presented first. In the sections that follow, each hypothesis has
been tested twice, using different techniques in order to ensure the robustness of the results. In
addition to the hypothesized relationships, the direct relationships between variables used in this
study are also measured for further robustness. The presentation of quantitative findings of each
section is then accompanied with a description of the findings. In addition to the findings that
directly relate to the hypothesized relationships, several exploratory statistical tests are
conducted. The results of these exploratory tests are included in the final section of this chapter
and are discussed thoroughly in Chapter 8.
To test the hypotheses, in each case the dependent variable is regressed on the
independent variable using linear regression techniques. To test for moderation, the interaction
effect between independent and moderator variables is used for the regression. In each step, all
necessary controls including the direct relationship between the moderator and the dependent
variable are taken into consideration. To test for mediation, the method used in this study follows
the three-step approach proposed by Barron and Kenny (1986).
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The findings of this dissertation have been presented in the following format: First, the
different approaches for data analysis have been explained. Second, I have proceeded by
providing descriptive statistics of the data, followed by preliminary testing of the data consistent
with past research (e.g., Thornhill and White, 2007). Third, the analysis of data has been
conducted using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the hypothesized relationships.
Finally, the summary of results has been presented, before a discussion of findings in Chapter 8.

7.2 Preliminary Analysis
To test the hypotheses, two different methods are used. First, I conduct the statistical
analysis using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in SPSS.

While the data consists of

two levels, limitations within group sample size (i.e., number of business units corresponding to
each corporation) inhibit the use of hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), which requires a
minimum of 25 subjects at each level, as the statistical method for data analysis. Therefore, all
corporate-level factors are disaggregated to the business unit level. Subsequently, all corporate
effects are (through inclusion of corporate parent information) regressed onto all dependent
variables in the model. Prior to conducting the statistical analysis, a series of statistical tests are
conducted in order to determine the factors that are to be used in the analysis. These factors are
particularly important to the measurement of business unit strategy, since the survey used in the
study contains various items that are related to each business unit strategy type. In order to
determine the items used in the study, an approach consistent with the one used in previous
research (Thornhill and White, 2007) is used. An exploratory factor analysis (EFA), followed by
a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), is conducted on 18 of the factors that were listed in the
“Strategy” section in the survey. As a result, the items from the two emerging factors (each with
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eigenvalues greater than 1) are used to construct a new measure for each type of business unit
strategy. Since the survey used a similar 5-point Likert scale, the new measure is constructed
through averaging the responses to the survey and to the specified items.
As explained in Chapter 6, a similar approach to measurement of business unit strategy is
used for measurement of controls implemented by corporate headquarters on each of the
investigated business units. The factor analysis leads to two emerging factors. A review of the
factors reveals similarities to the definitions provided for strategic and financial controls. Similar
to the approach taken to measure business unit strategy, the ratio for the average of items for
emerging factors is used to construct a new measure that focuses on controls implemented by
corporate headquarters on each of the business units.
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics

Span
DR
DU
DT
HQ Size
BU Strategy Ratio
Controls Ratio

N
2704
2704
2704
2704
2704
2704
2704

Mean
18.34
0.6559
0.8798
1.5358
35.90
1.25
0.974

S.D.
9.096
0.2977
0.5531
0.3839
21.37
0.8774
0.0092
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Min.
3
0.16
0.23
0.61
6
0.2
0.5

Max.
41
1.39
2
2.24
89
4.5
4.143

Table 7.2: Correlations Among All Corporate-level Variables a

1

1. Corporate Strategy

2

3

4

1

2. Controls

0.217**

1

3. Span

0.067*

-0.216**

1

4. HQ Size

0.115**

-0.203**

0.456**

1

0.043

0.024

-0.012

0.005

5. CEO Experience

a

5

1

Standardized coefficients are reported

N=2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, and CEO experience are measured for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are
measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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Table 7.3: Correlations Among All Subsidiary-level Variables a
1

3

4

1

1. Controls

a

2

2. Business Unit Strategy

0.033**

1

3. Financial Performance

-0.024

0.033**

1

4. Market Performance

0.113**

-0.024

0.318**

Standardized coefficients are reported

N=2704 subsidiaries (business units)
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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1

7.3 Ordinary Least Squares Regressions in SPSS
Table 7.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for the dataset and the variables included
in the proposed theoretical model. Using the Correlate function in SPSS, the correlation matrix
for the variables included in the model, including the interaction terms, is generated. The detailed
correlation matrix can be found in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3.

7.3.1 Test of Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis (H1) of this study predicts that related diversified corporations are
more likely to employ strategic controls as their primary mechanism of control on their business
units. On the other hand, Hypothesis 1 also predicts that unrelated diversified corporations are
more likely to emphasize the use of financial controls as their primary control mechanism.
To test this hypothesis, I conduct OLS regression between the variables “corporate
strategy” and “controls.” The SPSS statistical analysis yields the results indicated in Table 7.4.
On account of the way that the controls variable has been operationalized in this study
(i.e., the use of a ratio that captures both financial controls and strategic controls with higher
values indicating a stronger emphasis on strategic controls), a positive and significant
relationship between the two variables (corporate strategy and controls) should lend support to
the hypothesized relationship.
With an adjusted R2 of 0.24, the results indicate a significant relationship (P<0.05) to
exist between the diversification strategy pursued by corporations and the controls that have been
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implemented by investigated corporations on their business units. The analysis also demonstrates
a positive standardized B coefficient that is equivalent to 0.047 (see Model 2, Table 7.4).
Based on these values, we can conclude that the hypothesized positive relationship
between corporate strategy and corporate controls (Hypothesis 1) has been supported, based on
the statistical analysis of the data.

7.3.2 Test of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 of this study focuses on the positive moderating effect of the size of
corporate headquarters (HQ size) on the relationship between corporate strategy and the type of
controls that corporations implement on their business units. Based on the hypothesized
relationship, ceteris paribus, larger corporate headquarters should increase the likelihood of
corporations pursuing related diversification employing strategic controls, while smaller
corporate headquarters should minimize the likelihood. This hypothesis suggests that while
related diversified corporations are expected to put stronger emphasis on strategic controls
compared to unrelated diversified corporations (H1), those related diversified corporations with
larger staff in their corporate headquarters are likely to put even stronger emphasis on strategic
controls relative to related diversified corporations with smaller staff in their corporate
headquarters.
To test this hypothesis, the OLS regression from SPSS is used to conduct the statistical
analysis of the effect of the interaction between HQ size and corporate strategy on controls.
Table 7.4 summarizes the results of the regression analysis.
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The results of the analysis lend support to the hypothesized relationship (p<0.05) with a
B coefficient of 0.09 (Table 7.4, Model 4). Therefore, we can conclude that the hypothesized
relationship has been supported by the data. To interpret the results, I use the approach proposed
by Aiken and West (1991) to plot the significant interactions. For Hypothesis 2, Figure 7.1
shows stronger emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls in corporations with
smaller corporate headquarters staff compared to corporations with larger corporate headquarters
staff. In addition, for corporations pursuing related diversification there is a stronger emphasis on
strategic controls when there is a larger number of staff at corporate headquarters.

Figure 7.1: Effect of Interaction Between Size of HQ and Corporate
Strategy on Controls
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Table 7.4: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Corporate Strategy
and Controls and the Moderation of the Relationship by Span, CEO Background, and Size
of HQ Staff a

Independent Variables

Control Variables
Corporate Effects
Size of Business Unit
Family Structure
IDRO Ownership
Industry Effects
Geographic Dispersion

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.13*
0.12*
0.03*
-0.02
-0.04*
0.07*

0.13*
0.12*
0.03*
-0.02
-0.04*
0.07*

0.13*
0.12*
0.03*
-0.02
-0.04*
0.07*

0.13*
0.12*
0.03*
-0.02
-0.04*
0.07*

0.047*

0.049*

0.065*

-0.15*
-0.02*
0.07

-0.23*
0.03*
0.03

Effect of Corporate Strategy on Controls
Corporate Strategy
Moderators
Number of Business Units (Span)
Size of HQ Staff
CEO Background
Interactions
Span × Corporate Strategy
Size of HQ Staff × Corporate Strategy
CEO Background × Corporate Strategy
R2
∆ R2
a

-0.08*
0.09*
0.06*
0.22

0.24
0.02

0.28
0.04

0.31
0.03

Standardized coefficients are reported

N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary
123 for a total of 2,704).
* p<.05
** p<.01

7.3.3 Test of Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 of this dissertation suggests a positive moderating role for the expertise
and/or background of the corporate CEO on the relationship between corporate strategy and
controls. This means that business units that are operating in an industry within the area of
expertise of the corporate CEO (i.e., CEOs with relevance of educational background or prior
work experience in the area) are more likely to implement and exercise strategic controls. The
moderating role of CEO expertise is tested using the interaction term between the independent
variable, corporate strategy, and relevance of the CEO’s background and work experience to the
area in which each business unit is performing. As a result of choosing this approach, different
business units of the same corporation can receive different evaluations based on the degree to
which they are aligned with their corporate parent’s CEO’s background and expertise.
The results indicate that the interaction between CEO expertise and corporate strategy
significantly influences the controls that are implemented by corporations on their business units
(P<0.05). With an R2 of 0.31, the statistical analysis also reveals a B coefficient of 0.06 (Table
7.4, Model 4).
Following Aiken and West’s (1991) approach, I have plotted the significant interaction
for Hypothesis 3 in Figure 7.2. The plot shows a stronger emphasis on financial controls relative
to strategic controls when the corporate CEO lacks expertise or background relative to the
industry to which a business unit belongs. In contrast, when the CEO possesses expertise or
background in the area of a business unit’s operation, strategic controls become more prominent.
However, Figure 7.2 also shows CEO expertise and background to be less utilized when
corporations increase diversification into unrelated businesses and more utilized when business
units are more related. Based on findings from the statistical analysis, I conclude by finding
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support for the hypothesized moderating effect of CEO expertise on the relationship between
corporate strategy and corporate controls.

Figure 7.2: Effect of Interaction Between CEO Expertise and
Corporate Strategy on Controls

7.3.4 Tests for Hypothesis 4
Through Hypothesis 4, this study has suggested that the number of business units
controlled by a corporation has a negative moderating effect on the ability of corporations to
implement strategic controls. In such cases, corporations tend to lean towards a stronger
emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls. Based on this hypothesis,
corporations with a smaller number of business units (smaller span) are more likely to have a
stronger emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls, when compared to corporations
with a larger number of business units (greater span), ceteris paribus.
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To test this hypothesis, the effect of the interaction of the number of business units
(span) with corporate strategy has been tested on corporate controls that have been
implemented on each of the business units. After controlling for the effect of other moderating
variables, the statistical significance of the moderating effect is tested using SPSS. With those
results, the statistical analysis is conducted. The results can be observed in Table 7.4, Model 4.
Aiken and West’s (1991) approach has been followed to plot the results from this
moderating effect in Figure 7.3. The plot shows that the association of relatedness and emphasis
of strategic controls is stronger when the corporation manages a smaller set of business units. In
contrast, corporations with a larger number of business units demonstrate a weaker emphasis on
strategic controls compared to corporations with a smaller number of business units.
Accounting for the control variables, the results indicate that the number of business units
owned and operated by each corporation has a significant and negative moderating effect on the
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls (P<0.05, B=-0.08).
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Figure 7.3: Effect of Interaction Between Number of Subsidiaries
(Span) and Corporate Strategy on Controls

7.3.5 Tests for Hypotheses 5 and 6
A main objective of this study has been to reconceptualize strategy at the business unit
level as endogenous to corporate strategy. Hypothesis 5 of this dissertation suggests that controls
mediate the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. Hypothesis 6
suggests that a stronger emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial controls by the
corporate headquarters as the primary control mechanism increases the likelihood of business
units pursuing product leadership as the business-unit-level strategy. Also, Hypothesis 6 suggests
stronger emphasis on financial controls relative to strategic controls to be associated with a
higher likelihood of pursuing operational excellence as the business-unit-level strategy. In order
to test Hypothesis 5, the four-step approach proposed by Barron and Kenny (1986) is used.
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For the first step of the analysis, the direct relationship between corporate controls and
business unit strategy (mediator and dependent variables) has been investigated. The results of
the analysis, which have been included in Table 7.5, Model 2, indicate a significant relationship
(p<.01, B=0.16), which satisfies the first requirement for Barron and Kenny’s (1986) mediation
analysis, while lending support to Hypothesis 6.
To complete my test of Hypothesis 5, another step is taken to test the direct relationship
between corporate strategy and business unit strategy (independent and dependent variables).
The results from Model 3 in Table 7.5 also indicate a significant relationship between corporate
strategy and business unit strategy (p<.05, B=0.29). My previous analysis for Hypotheses 1 (the
relationship between the independent and mediator variables in the mediation relationship)
based on Table 7.4 (Model 2) has demonstrated a significant relationship between corporate
strategy and controls (p<0.05, B=0.047), which satisfies another step for the mediation analysis.
Therefore, I proceed to the final step of the mediation analysis, which tests the simultaneous
effects of corporate strategy and controls on business unit strategy. The results, which have
been included in Table 7.5, Model 4, demonstrate that both variables (corporate strategy and
controls) have significant effects on business unit strategy, simultaneously (p<.05, B=0.21 for
corporate strategy and p<.05, B=0.14 for controls), which supports a partial mediation
hypothesis and, therefore, Hypothesis 5.
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Table 7.5: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Controls and
Business Unit Strategy a

Independent Variables

Control Variables
Corporate Effects
Size of Business Unit
Family Structure
IDRO Ownership
Industry Effects
Geographic Dispersion

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.14*
0.17*
0.21*
0.01
0.01
0.02

0.14*
0.16*
0.19*
0.01
0.01
0.02

0.14*
0.16*
0.19*
0.01
0.01
0.02

0.14*
0.16*
0.19*
0.01
0.01
0.02

Effect of Controls on Business Unit Strategy
Controls

0.16*

Effect of Corporate Strategy on Business Unit Strategy
Corporate Strategy

R2
∆ R2
a

0.122

0.123
0.001

0.14*

0.29**

0.21*

0.13
0.01

0.15
0.02

Standardized coefficients are reported

N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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For robustness, I also conduct the Sobel test to evaluate the mediation effect (Preacher
and Hayes, 2004). The Sobel test derives a t-statistic based on the comparison between the
magnitude of the indirect effect and its standard error of measurement (Sobel, 1982) using the
following relationships:

t = (αβ) ⁄ (Standard Error)
and
Standard Error = √(α2 σ2β + β2σ2α)

Based on the t values for the relationship between corporate strategy and controls
(t=21.563) and the simultaneous effect of corporate strategy and controls on business unit
strategy (t=3.294), the Sobel test supports the mediation relationship (p<0.05). Interpreting these
results, and consistent with Barron and Kenny (1986) and Sobel (1982), I can conclude that I
find support for partial mediation of the relationship between corporate strategy and business
unit strategy by controls that have been implemented on business units. Therefore, I find
additional support for the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 5.

7.3.6 Test of Hypothesis 7a and 7b
Hypotheses 7a and 7b of this study suggest the fit between business unit strategy and the
type of controls to which each business unit is subject influence financial performance and
market performance at the business unit level. According to these hypotheses, business units that
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are subject to financial controls are more likely to demonstrate higher financial performance and
market performance if they pursue strategies in line with operational excellence. On the other
hand, if pursuing product leadership as the business unit strategy, higher financial performance
and market performance will be more likely if the business unit is subject to strategic controls.
To test these hypotheses, OLS regression is used to measure the influence of the
interaction between controls and business unit strategy on the financial performance and market
performance of the business units. The results corresponding to the analysis can be found in
Table 7.6 (Model 4) and Table 7.7 (Model 4).
The results included in Table 7.6 and Table 7.7 indicate a significant moderating role for
controls in the relationship between business strategy and financial performance (p<0.05,
B=0.09) and a marginally significant moderating role for controls in the relationship between
business unit strategy and market performance (p<0.1, B=0.02). To further evaluate the
significance of the tested hypotheses, I proceed to examine the plots for the hypothesized
moderation relationship.
Aiken and West’s (1991) approach has been followed to plot the results of the analysis
for the moderation effects hypothesized in H7a and H7b in Figure 7.4 and Figure 7.5. The plot
in Figure 7.4 demonstrates the importance of the fit between business unit strategy and controls
implemented over business units to the subsequent financial performance of business units.
Figure 7.4 shows that business units pursuing product leadership achieve higher financial
performance when they are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls. However, the
plot does not show a significant difference to exist in financial performance for business units
that pursue operational excellence strategies. Interestingly, an examination of the plot in Figure
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7.4 shows that subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls, business units that pursue
operational excellence strategies exhibit a marginally higher financial performance compared to
those that are subject to stronger emphasis on financial controls, which counters the prediction
of the hypothesis. Therefore, only partial support can be reported for H7a.

Figure 7.4: Effect of Fit Between Controls and Business Unit
Strategy on Financial Performance

Similar to steps taken for H7a, moderation plots are used to further examine the findings
of the test for H7b. While the statistical analysis for H7b shows marginal support for the
hypothesized relationship, an examination of Figure 7.5 yields interesting results. The findings
show that the difference between market share performance is larger for business units pursuing
operational excellence strategies compared to those that pursue product leadership. The results
show that, counter to the hypothesized relationship, being subject to strategic controls is
associated with marginally higher performance for business units that pursue operational
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excellence. Therefore, and based on an examination of Figure 7.5, it can be concluded that
although interesting findings are revealed, no support can be given to H7b.

Figure 7.5: Effect of Fit Between Controls and Business Unit
Strategy on Market Performance

7.4 Summary
Chapter 7 contains the statistical tests for this dissertation’s hypotheses. The findings lend
support to most of the hypotheses. However, the analysis reveals the mediation relationship in
Hypothesis 5 to be partial and not full. Also, of the two hypotheses relating business unit strategy
to performance, one is not supported and the other is partially supported. All other hypotheses
have been supported. Additionally, my analysis reveals controls to be a partial mediator in the
relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. The summary of hypotheses
and results can be found in Table 7.8.
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Table 7.6: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Business Unit
Strategy and Financial Performance and the Moderation of the Relationship by Controls

Independent Variables

Control Variables
Corporate Effects
Size of Business Unit
Family Structure
IDRO Ownership
Industry Effects
Geographic Dispersion

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.06*
0.02
-0.02
-0.06
0.02
0.02

0.05*
0.02
-0.01
-0.06
0.02
0.02

0.05*
0.02
-0.01
-0.06
0.02
0.02

0.05*
0.02
-0.01
-0.06
-0.02
0.02

0.11*

0.14*

0.16*

0.06

0.07

Effect of Business Unit Strategy on Financial Performance
Business Unit Strategy
Moderator
Controls
Interactions
Controls × Business Unit Strategy

0.09*

R2
∆ R2
a

0.06

0.07
0.01

0.09
0.02

0.12
0.03

Standardized coefficients are reported

N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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Table 7.7: Results of Regression Analysis of the Relationship Between Business Unit Strategy
and Market Performance and the Moderation of the Relationship by Controls

Independent Variables

Control Variables
Corporate Effects
Size of Business Unit
Family Structure
IDRO Ownership
Industry Effects
Geographic Dispersion

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.05*
0.07*
0.06*
-0.01
0.01
0.01

0.03*
0.06*
0.04*
-0.02
0.01
0.01

0.03*
0.04*
0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.01

0.03*
0.04*
0.02
-0.02
0.01
0.01

0.36*

0.36*

0.30*

0.14*

0.08*

Effect of Business Unit Strategy on Market Share Performance
Business Unit Strategy
Moderator
Controls
Interactions
Controls × Business Unit Strategy

0.02 Ɨ

R2
∆ R2
a

0.03

0.11
0.08

0.11
0.00

0.12
0.01

Standardized coefficients are reported

N= 2704 (corporate strategy, span, HQ size, corporate effects, family structure, IDRO ownership, geographic dispersion, and CEO experience are measured
for a total of 193 corporations. Controls are measured for each individual subsidiary for a total of 2,704).

Ɨ p<0.1
* p<.05
** p<.01
*** p<.001
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Table 7.8: Summary of Tests of Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H1: Corporations that pursue related diversification are likely to put a stronger
emphasis on strategic controls versus financial controls as their primary mechanism of
controlling their business units. Conversely, corporations that pursue unrelated
diversification are likely to put a stronger emphasis on financial controls versus strategic
controls as their primary mechanism of controlling their business units.
H2: The size of the corporate office (i.e., the number of corporate staff) moderates the
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; under the condition of a
larger corporate office, there will be a stronger effect between a corporate strategy of
related diversification and the emphasis on strategic controls, while under the condition
of smaller corporate offices there will be a weaker effect.
H3: The corporate CEO’s relevance of past experience relative to a business unit
moderates the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls; in the
presence of a corporate CEO who possesses relevant expertise related to a business unit,
there will be a stronger relationship between related diversification and emphasis on
strategic control.

P
p<0.05

Result
Support

p<0.05

Support

p<0.05

Support

H4: The number of business units owned by a corporation moderates the relationship
between corporate strategy and corporate controls; the positive relationship between
related diversification and emphasizing strategic control will be weaker when the
number of business units is greater.
H5: The influence of corporate strategy on business strategy is mediated through
corporate controls.

p<0.05

Support

p<0.05
for all
paths
p<0.05

Support for
Partial
Mediation
Support

P<0.05

Partial Support

--

Not Supported

H6: Business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls are more
likely to pursue product leadership strategies than business units that are subject to a
stronger emphasis on financial controls, while business units that are subject to a
stronger emphasis on financial controls are more likely to pursue operational excellence
strategies than business units that are subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic
controls.
H7a: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit and the corporate
controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent financial performance; business
units pursuing operational excellence strategies will exhibit higher financial
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls and business
units pursuing product leadership strategies will exhibit higher financial performance
when subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls.
H7b: The interaction between the strategic direction of a business unit and the corporate
controls that it is subject to influences its subsequent market share performance;
business units pursuing operational excellence strategies will exhibit higher market share
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on financial controls and business
units pursuing product leadership strategies will exhibit higher market share
performance when subject to a stronger emphasis on strategic controls.
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CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION

8.1 Introduction
Corporate strategy and its influence on the performance of business units has been the
focus of many researchers during past decades. However, its role and significance have often
been found to be trivial when aggregated within the corporate effects construct, particularly
when compared to the business unit effects construct. Therefore, I developed a theoretical model
to reconceptualize the mechanism through which corporate strategy influences business unit
strategy. Through this dissertation, I disaggregated the corporate strategy and corporate control
variables from the corporate effects variable normally used, and I disaggregated the business unit
strategy variable from the business unit effects construct. In addition, I suggested and tested
hypotheses that conceptualize business unit strategy as endogenous to corporate strategy through
the mechanism of controls implemented on each of them by the corporation.
In my arguments, which build on past research (e.g., Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993;
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), I proposed that corporations’ ability to implement different control
structures on their business units rests on their available capacity to process information.
Therefore, corporations with higher capacities are capable of enforcing controls that are more indepth and comprehensive than simple and objective financial controls. To capture information
processing capacity in corporations, I focused on factors such as corporate strategy, span (i.e.,
number of business units controlled by the corporation), CEO experience (i.e., relevant
experience and/or education of the corporate CEO in regards to the industry in which each
business unit operates), and HQ size (i.e., the number of staff that form the corporate
headquarters).
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Further, I proposed and tested relationships to establish the link between controls
implemented by the corporation and business unit strategy (i.e., strategy pursued by each of the
various business units of the corporation). I argued that in cases where a stronger emphasis of
financial controls relative to strategic controls exists, business units are more likely to adopt
business unit strategies that are in line with operational excellence. In contrast, I argued that
business units subject to a stronger emphasis of strategic controls are more likely to emphasize
business unit strategies that fall into the product leadership category.
In this dissertation, I developed and tested a theoretical model of relationships that define
the influence of corporate strategy on the performance of business units. The graphical
presentation of the findings for these tests of the theoretical model has been summarized in
Figure 8.1.

8.2 Discussion of Analysis
This dissertation has set out to reassess the importance of corporate strategy in the
performance of business units. To complete this study, the relationships between corporate
strategy, corporate controls, business unit strategy, and business unit performance and the
relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls moderated by span, HQ size, and
CEO experience were investigated. In sections that follow, I provide a brief review of each of the
variables included within the model and the discussion of findings related to each of the tested
relationships involving them.
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Figure 8. 1: Summary of Findings

Financial
Performance
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Subsidiaries
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Corporate Strategy
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Controls

S
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Business Unit Strategy

S
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CEO Experience

Size of HQ

Market
Performance

S: Supported
NS: Not Supported
PS: Partial Support
*

: Support for partial mediation found
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8.2.1 Corporate Strategy
The main aim of this dissertation is to revisit corporate strategy and to investigate its
influence and role in the performance of business units. A review of past literature shows
conflicting results, leading to different conclusions on the importance of corporate strategy,
especially when this construct is aggregated with the corporate effects construct (e.g., Rumelt,
1982, 1974; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001). Therefore, I considered that
there was a need to revisit the concept and to reconceptualize and examine the role of corporate
strategy within corporations.
To achieve this objective, I constructed my theoretical model such that corporate strategy
and business unit strategy are not independent factors, but rather one where corporate strategy
influences business unit strategy. However, there was the need to conceptualize a mechanism
that can properly explain and predict such relationships. Building on work from the area of
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1994, 1976; Macey, 1997), I theorized a substantial role for
controls in the relationship between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. To establish
the relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls, I built on the literature about
information processing capacity in organizations (e.g., Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993;
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994).
The majority of past research focusing on corporate strategy has faced challenges in the
measurement of the construct. Although the development of the entropy measure (Palepu, 1985;
Jacquemin and Berry, 1979) introduced a significant leap forward in that regard, it resulted in the
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adoption of the same categorical approach that was used by earlier studies. To resolve such
challenges, and to avoid the loss of valuable explanatory power in the boundary points of each
category, and consistent with approaches in past research (Markides, 1995), I developed a ratio
that measures the degree of related diversification relative to total diversification. As all
components of this new variable had already been validated (Hoskisson et al., 1993), it did not
face any challenges from the point of validity. This variable was later used in linear regression
techniques to measure the strength and significance of the hypothesized relationships concerning
corporate strategy.

8.2.2 Corporate Controls
The notion of corporate controls has been repeatedly identified as a main concern for
corporate headquarters. However, the difficulty of measurement of controls has led to its
exclusion from most empirical studies. The access of this study to a proprietary dataset provided
the unique opportunity to develop a measure that captures many elements that could be defined
as characteristics of financial controls and strategic controls. Exploratory factor analysis (EFA)
was conducted on one half of the dataset, and the items for emerging factors were used in a
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on the other half of the dataset and, once confirmed, were
compared against definitions from literature and then used to construct a continuous variable that
represents the emphasis of one type of control relative to the other. This measure was then used

141

to test the hypotheses that relate corporate controls to corporate strategy, business unit strategy,
and business unit performance.
The ability to measure corporate controls allows this study to take a further step in
unpacking the notion of corporate effects as studied in much past literature. Corporations employ
various mechanisms to ensure that their business units perform in line with corporate
expectations and meet designated overall objectives. Corporations may subscribe to more
subjective and in-depth assessments of processes, decisions, and strategies of their business
units, or may put their emphasis on more objective quarterly or annual financial reports. Any
mechanism employed by corporate headquarters follows the objective of ensuring that the best
interest of the corporation is not compromised. However, corporations are not without
constraints in pursuing their objectives. A main constraint for corporate headquarters that inhibits
the depth of their corporate controls results from their ability to process information required to
efficiently perform this task.
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the effect of corporate strategy on
business unit strategy through corporate controls. Therefore, corporate controls have been
theorized to have a mediating role in the relationship between the two aforementioned variables.
However, this study has also proposed moderating roles for other factors such as span, CEO
experience, and HQ size in the first part of the mediation relationship. The second part of the
mediation model focuses on the effect of controls on business unit strategy.
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8.2.3 Business Unit Strategy
Much of the past literature in strategic management has focused on the importance of
business unit strategy and its effect on business unit performance (e.g., Uotila et al., 2009;
Thornhill and White, 2007; Hill, 1988). Business unit strategy has been recognized as one of the
most important determinants of performance alongside industry-level factors and influences.
When compared to business unit strategy, most past research has focused on corporate effects
instead of corporate strategy, and has identified the influence of corporate effects to be trivial.
Not only has past research failed to deconstruct the notion of corporate effects and to distinguish
corporate strategy, it has also followed a common thread in conceptualizing business unit
strategy as a factor independent from corporate-level influences (e.g., McGahan and Porter,
1997; Bowman and Helfat, 2001).
One of the main contributions of this dissertation has been to reconceptualize business
unit strategy as endogenous to corporate strategy. To achieve this objective, as described earlier,
corporate controls was hypothesized to mediate the relationship between corporate strategy and
business unit strategy. Therefore, this study sets out to unpack our understanding of corporate
effects and better explain the mechanism through which corporate-level factors influence
strategy and performance at the business unit level.
To measure business unit strategy, an approach consistent with previous studies was
selected, where a new measure was constructed from items of distinctive factors of an
exploratory analysis. The items of the measure were compared carefully against definitions that
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distinguish each category of strategy. Subsequently, the ratio measure was developed for use in
the analysis.

8.2.4 Effect of Corporate Strategy on Controls
The analysis of the direct relationship between corporate strategy and corporate controls
showed support for the hypothesized relationship. In the sample, corporations that were more
relatedly diversified (i.e., higher ratio of related diversification to total diversification measures)
demonstrated a tendency to implement corporate controls, with a stronger emphasis on strategic
controls (i.e., higher ratio of strategic controls to financial controls ratio). In my arguments
throughout this study, I suggested that corporate controls other than sole financial controls are
required to realize the advantages associated with related diversification. Thus, my supported the
hypothesis that corporations emphasize strategic controls to ensure that cost and other
efficiencies can be realized when they pursue related diversification.
The findings of this dissertation also supported the other side of the previous argument.
The significant relationship found suggests that corporations pursuing higher levels of unrelated
diversification put stronger emphasis on financial controls. However, this relationship was
moderated by span. As the number of business units increased, corporations demonstrated the
tendency to put a stronger emphasis on financial controls and to lessen their exercise of strategic
controls. Conversely, ceteris paribus, corporations with fewer business units demonstrated that
they are likely to put a stronger emphasis on strategic controls than those with more business
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units. In addition, there was a stronger emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial
controls when the corporation was pursuing related diversification and less of an emphasis on
strategic controls relative to financial controls when pursuing unrelated diversification.
Interestingly, the balance of controls favoured strategic controls over financial controls, whether
the corporation was pursuing related or unrelated diversification (see Figure 7.3). This finding
suggests that business unit managers in corporations supervised and/or owned by IDRO perceive
that their corporate parents favour a slighter emphasis on strategic controls relative to financial
controls and that this emphasis is accentuated for corporations pursuing related diversification.
The effect of corporate strategy on corporate controls was also moderated by the size of
the staff that constituted the corporate headquarters (HQ size). The statistical analysis showed a
significant and positive moderating role for HQ size. This meant that, ceteris paribus, a larger
HQ size increased the tendency of corporations to emphasize strategic controls, while a smaller
HQ size led to more corporations emphasizing financial controls. This finding is also consistent
with the hypothesized relationship and the supporting arguments. This effect is accentuated for
corporations pursuing related diversification (see Figure 7.1)
In my arguments, I suggested that a larger number of staff in corporate headquarters can
increase the capacity of the corporate headquarters to process information. As a result, when HQ
size is larger, the ability of the corporate headquarters to process information is greater. This
further increases the ability of the corporation to implement strategic controls. Not surprisingly,
this finding was supported by the analysis.
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While the corporate headquarters and their staff are instrumental to the processing of
information, the ultimate task of decision making rests with the corporate CEO. As argued in
previous chapters, corporate CEOs are more likely to pay attention to details of operational
activities in business units that perform within industries compatible with their education and/or
work experience. The findings from the analysis also support these arguments — business units
operating within industries related to the background and/or experience of the corporate CEO
were more likely to be subject to greater emphasis on strategic controls. In contrast, when the
corporate CEO had no expertise related to the industry of the business unit, the likelihood of
implementation of financial controls increased. This moderating effect was amplified when the
corporation was pursuing related diversification (see Figure 7.2).
The findings of this dissertation provide strong support for the arguments proposed.
Higher levels of information processing capacity can be achieved through more populous
corporate headquarters and/or having a corporate CEO who has industry expertise take charge.
On the other hand, the increased span of a corporation can lead to more of the information
processing capacity of corporate headquarters being utilized. The findings also confirm that the
availability or unavailability of information processing capacity is a crucial factor in selecting the
control systems used to control business units.

8.2.5 Effect of Corporate Controls on Business Unit Strategy
Corporate controls represent the mechanisms through which corporations ensure that the
operations of business units and decisions made by their directors remain fully aligned with the
146

expectations set at the corporate level. They also ensure that the overall best interests of the
corporation receive full primacy. In this study, I argued and hypothesized that corporate controls
also influence the decisions of business unit managers to select one type of strategy over another.
The findings of this study generally support the hypothesized relationships. My findings indicate
that business units that are subject to financial controls demonstrate a higher likelihood of
pursuing strategies that are in general considered to fall into the operational excellence category.
At the other end of the spectrum, business units subject to strategic controls are more likely to
adopt strategic orientations that resonate well with product leadership.
My findings are also an affirmation of predictions made by agency theorists. Managers at
the business unit level show the tendency to comply with requirements set by corporate
headquarters. While not investigated in this study, one can argue that motives for such
compliance stem from managers’ interest in preserving their own best interests. While not
surprising, the context of findings provides us with a better understanding of the underlying
processes of business unit strategy.

8.2.6 Mediating Role of Controls
While the effect of corporate strategy on corporate controls and the effect of these
controls on business unit strategy were tested separately, I also tested to see whether full or
partial mediation exists. As suggested throughout this dissertation, an important contribution has
been to conceptualize the effect of corporate strategy on business unit strategy through the
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mechanism of corporate controls. Investigating this relationship is not possible unless a
mediating role is considered for these controls.
The results of the analysis for mediation generally support the hypothesized relationship.
I found not only a direct and significant relationship between corporate strategy and business unit
strategy, but also an indirect and significant effect that takes place through corporate controls.
Therefore, the findings of this dissertation take a desired step in explaining the dimensions of
corporate effects that influence business unit strategy and performance.
While the partial mediation found in this dissertation is supportive of the hypothesized
relationship, it would be interesting to understand the mechanism behind the direct influence of
corporate strategy on business strategy, which has led to the observed partial mediation. One
explanation could reside in the fact that business unit managers normally have prior membership
within the corporate headquarters. This, in turn, could lead to an alignment of the strategic
directions of the corporation and the business unit, even when control mechanisms are not fully
developed. Another possible explanation for a partial mediation effect is that I only
disaggregated corporate strategy and controls from the corporate effects construct. This still
leaves corporate structure and corporate rewards aggregated with corporate effects.

8.2.7 Fit Between Controls and Business Unit Strategy
Although this study proposes business unit strategy to be influenced by corporate strategy
through controls, business unit managers can still exercise their judgement of appropriate action
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and pursue strategies that are not in line with the controls to which they are subject. However, as
I hypothesized, it is more likely for business units that ensure the fit between controls and
business unit strategy to achieve higher performance. The findings of this study lend partial
support to one of these hypotheses, and no support to the others.
My findings reveal that while the fit between business unit strategy and corporate
controls has a significant effect on business unit financial performance, it does not have a similar
effect on market performance. To further examine the effect of fit on market performance, I
allowed for a lagged measurement of market performance twice, each time for one year. While
the results were not significant, they demonstrated improvement. Therefore, the observed results
could be attributed to the limited time frame (five years) of the data.
An interesting point in my findings for the importance of fit reveals the superior role of
strategic controls compared to financial controls in subsequent business unit performance. While
the hypothesized relationship predicted a better fit for operational excellence strategies than
financial controls, further examination of my findings demonstrated that when business unit
managers perceive that they are subject to a balance of strategic and financial controls with a
slightly greater emphasis on strategic controls, then business units have higher financial and
market performance, although the difference in financial performance is not significant (see
Figures 7.4 and 7.5).
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8.3 Summary
The findings of this section stress the importance of fit between business unit strategy and
controls in business units. Business units that pursue a business unit strategy that does not fit
with the corporate controls that they are subject to can suffer in their financial performance,
especially if they are pursuing product leadership (see Figure 7.4). Such negative outcomes can
result from conflicts between the business unit and corporate parent, or from the lack of support
for strategic decisions made at the business unit level.
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CHAPTER 9: LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
9.1 Introduction
As is the case for all research, this dissertation is not without limitations. The limitations
of this dissertation are mainly the result of the characteristics of the dataset and the
methodological approach selected for data analysis. Throughout this dissertation, I have made
the attempt to minimize the effects from these limitations on the validity of my findings. While,
in my opinion, I have met success in achieving this objective, there still remains much room for
improvement should access to data with less limitations be made possible. In what follows, I
provide a list of limitations along with proper justifications and suggestions for improvement.
In addition to limitations, I also suggest improvements for this dissertation that can be
completed by future researchers. As will be discussed in this chapter, most limitations are the
result of limitations in the dataset. However, the unique nature of the dataset itself provided a
degree of richness that distinguishes this dissertation from previous research. My aim is to
identify opportunities to make improvements without compromising the value of this
dissertation.
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9.2 Limitations
One limitation is that the dataset used for testing the hypotheses was limited to
corporations with wholly owned business units and therefore did not include holding companies.
While there is little business-unit-level research on the differences between holding companies
and corporations, it seems logical to assume that the ownership stakes in business units would be
the source of various differences at the level of business units, particularly in the area of
corporate controls, as perceived by business unit managers. This dissertation, therefore, fails to
capture the differences when the business unit is not a wholly owned business unit.
The other limitation of this dissertation is its reliance on data that entirely belongs to
companies within Iran. Due to the private nature of wholly owned business units, access to their
financial and other data is very difficult in most parts of the world. There are very limited
sources that grant researchers access to data on the business units of corporations. However,
when access is possible, it is often impossible to trace business units back to their corporate
parents.
In addition, during the time that this dissertation was in progress, PIMS database, one of
the main sources of business-unit-level data that had been used for research in the past (e.g.,
White, 1986), was completely unavailable. The IDRO data used in this study, although
belonging to Iranian industries, provided one major advantage over other available databases: it
allowed access to very detailed and comprehensive data at the corporate and business unit levels.
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In addition, it provided proprietary access to survey data that evaluated the relationship between
each business unit and its corporate parent.
Another limitation of this research, which is rooted in the limitation just addressed above,
is the use of cross-sectional analysis instead of a longitudinal study. While I agree that a
longitudinal study would normally provide more valid conclusions for research such as this, as
mentioned before, the constraints posed by the structure of the Iranian economy would lend little
value, if any, to the validity of the findings in this dissertation. To minimize the limitation of the
cross-sectional approach, I used data from different years and lagged performance outcomes to
account for strategic decisions taking effect.
The approach used for the measurement of business unit strategy and corporate controls
is also the source of another limitation of this research. As mentioned throughout this
dissertation, I followed an approach in past research (Thornhill and White, 2007) to measure
business unit strategy. I also replicated the same steps to measure corporate controls. For both
measurements, I relied on data that had been collected through surveys completed by business
unit managers. A limitation of this approach is that it is based less on objective measures found
in archival data and, instead, relies more on retrospective data, which could raise questions of
reliability. To minimize the effect of this limitation, whenever possible, I used proxy variables
such as the number of meetings between corporate directors and business unit directors, the
number of correspondences throughout the year, and content analysis of some of the
correspondences. I then compared findings from these investigations with the results of the
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surveys. In the investigated cases, a higher interaction between the corporate headquarters and
the business unit, which signals a stronger emphasis on strategic controls, was associated with
similar findings in the surveys. These comparisons have shown convergence and have provided
further assurance regarding the reliability of the survey data.

9.3 Directions for Future Research
The limitations of this research also open up opportunities for future research. As
mentioned earlier, a main limitation of this dissertation is its reliance on data that belongs to
corporations from Iran. While the limitation of single-country data has existed in much past
research, the specification and characteristics of Iran’s economic structure may raise questions of
external validity. Therefore, one avenue proposed for future research is replication of this study
in countries with economic structures that are more compatible with market economy conditions.
However, such a task may prove to be very challenging, as access to data similar to what has
been used in this dissertation will be extremely difficult in the less centralized economies of
North America, Europe, and Southeast Asia.
When completing this dissertation, I encountered many instances of unique institutional
pressures that defined economic dynamics within Iran. While my intention has been to develop
and test a more generalizable theory on how corporate strategy influences business unit strategy
and business unit performance, there are many opportunities to investigate the Iranian setting on
the basis of its unique institutional arrangements. For institutional theorists, this provides a
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unique opportunity to build on data that has been collected for this research and to provide a
better look into the differences in institutional logics and their precursors. This approach will
also allow for a better understanding of the nature of the corporate parent–business unit
relationship and the logic through which the corporation and its business units operate.
Consequently, this approach could allow one to redefine outcome variables such as performance
to better fit with the objectives of managers in other contexts.
A main construct of interest in this dissertation is corporate controls. To develop the
corporate controls variable, I used survey data that was made available through IDRO. The
surveys, which were completed by managers of business units, however, could be subject to
limitations that can be addressed in future research. Firstly, although I tried to validate surveys
through triangulation methods (e.g., comparing with meeting notes, content analysis of
correspondences), they still lack the richness that can be achieved through face-to-face
interviews. The surveys include many aspects of financial controls and strategic controls that
have already been discussed in past literature, but because of the more subjective nature of
strategic controls it is possible that they may not encompass the notion of strategic controls
completely. Therefore, a study that builds on qualitative data from face-to-face interviews may
prove to be more suitable for this purpose. Secondly, while the pressure of corporate controls is
felt mostly by business unit managers, their development and implementation are done through
corporate headquarters. In this dissertation, I managed to include only one side of the story —
that of the business unit managers. Therefore, the study in this dissertation could benefit from
improvements in research designs that also capture the perspective of the corporate headquarters.
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CHAPTER 10: CONTRIBUTIONS

10.1 Introduction
This dissertation explores the influence of corporate strategy on business unit
performance through investigating the relationship between corporate-level strategy and business
unit strategy. Through its findings, this dissertation provides several theoretical contributions to
the field of corporate strategy. Additionally, the methodological approach used in this
dissertation provides contributions through better construct measurement. While the theoretical
contributions will help redefine the previously theorized relationships, the methodological
contributions will allow future researchers to apply measures that are better rooted in theory and
more relevant to the topic of interest.
Besides contributions to theory and methodology, the findings of this dissertation have
implications for practice. The discussion of findings provides practitioners with a better
understanding of factors critical to the success of the implementation and execution of corporate
strategy and the design of corporate structure. This is especially true for the corporate
headquarters that implements corporate strategy. In what follows, I provide a more detailed
elaboration of the contributions made by this dissertation.
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10.2 Contributions to Theory
The vast literature on corporate strategy is overwhelmed with conflicting findings that
stress or undermine the significance of corporate strategy on business unit performance. Much of
this discrepancy has arisen from confusion due to the interchangeable use of corporate
strategy/corporate effects and business strategy/business effects. This confusion has in part
resulted from the lack of consensus on an adequate and universally accepted definition of
corporate strategy as a construct. As a result, studies comparing influences from the corporate
level and the business level lack enough common ground which make a proper comparative
assessment of their findings not possible.
In this dissertation, I have made an attempt to clarify corporate strategy as a construct of
interest before approaching empirical evidence. Through an extensive review of past and
contemporary literature, I have defined corporate strategy as a construct. Building on the works
of Dundas and Richardson, (1988), Grant (1995), and Collis and Montgomery (1998), I define
corporate strategy as a corporation’s choice for value creation through related or unrelated
diversification. Subsequently, I have distinguished between studies building on findings resulting
from measurement of corporate effects and those that have used corporate strategy as their
construct of interest.
Besides the interchangeable use of effects and strategy — whether at the corporate level
or business level — past research has often failed to establish the relationship between corporatelevel and business-level factors and has instead focused on comparing their effects on business157

level outcome variables such as performance (e.g., Bowman and Helfat, 2001; McGahan and
Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1982). Such studies have often conceptualized corporate-level factors and
business-level factors as independent from one another, which has resulted in the attenuation of
the effects of factors from one level (the corporate level) and exaggeration of influences from the
other (the business level).
Consequently, much confusion has resulted in the corporate strategy literature regarding
the modest significance of corporate strategy because of the conceptualization of business-level
strategy and corporate strategy as exogenous variables that are comparable. As explained earlier,
the confusion has increased because corporate strategy has not properly been distinguished from
corporate effects and its constituents such as strategy, structure, control, and reward systems.
In this dissertation, I have taken the step of distinguishing corporate strategy as a
constituent of corporate effects and business strategy as a constituent of business effects. In
addition, I have conceptualized the role of corporate controls in the effect of corporate strategy
on business unit strategy.
As explained earlier, in this dissertation I have conceptualized the role of corporate
controls in the influence of corporate strategy on business unit strategy. While some researchers
have pointed to the significance of corporate controls in the management of corporations (e.g.,
Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994; Hoskisson, Hill, and Kim, 1993), the mechanism through which
corporate controls plays such a role has remained ambiguous.
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In this dissertation, I have built on research related to agency theory and information
processing theory to conceptualize a mediating role for controls in the relationship between
corporate strategy and business strategy. The statistical analysis that has been conducted in this
dissertation lends further support to this conceptualization. As a consequence of this approach, I
have also made a contribution to the area of research on corporate strategy through confirming
its role as a significant determinant of business-unit-level performance.
This dissertation also contributes to our understanding of the role of information
processing capacity (IPC) in the management and performance of corporations. While it has been
generally accepted that IPC is important, there has been very little work done to conceptualize
the mechanism through which it exerts its influence. In this dissertation, I have focused on IPC in
corporate headquarters and its interactive effect with corporate strategy on corporate controls
mechanisms developed and selected. While I focus only on three aspects that influence IPC, it is
an initial step towards establishing IPC as a constituent of theoretical frameworks in future
corporate strategy research.

10.3 Contributions to Methodology
There are also several methodological contributions offered by this dissertation. Firstly,
following the steps taken by Hoskisson and Johnson (1992) and Markides (1995), this
dissertation has taken the approach of transforming the indices for diversification that are
provided by the entropy measure (Jacquemin and Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) into a continuous
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variable that encompasses both dimensions of related and unrelated diversification. While the
approach itself is not novel, it has further enhanced the aforementioned works through the use of
DT instead of DU in the denominator to capture the full extent of diversification in the developed
measure. Additionally, this dissertation also takes a step towards making full use of the
developed continuous measure instead of the categorical approach used in past research (e.g.,
Markides, 1995).
Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this dissertation has proposed a new
measurement for corporate controls. While the notion of corporate controls has been present in
much of the corporate strategy literature, measurement challenges have inhibited researchers
from measuring them. As a result, corporate controls have remained as a conceptual notion in
most studies. I have utilized IDRO’s dataset to develop a corporate controls measure that is
consistent with aspects of strategic controls and financial controls identified in past research. To
conduct the measurement, I have followed the steps taken by Thornhill and White (2007) for the
measurement of business strategy on the basis of a survey. This approach has allowed me to
construct an instrument to measure corporate controls and to utilize it for testing the hypotheses
of this dissertation.

10.4 Implications for Practice
The findings of this dissertation also have implications that could contribute to the
practice of corporate strategy. The main contribution of this dissertation is in providing insight
160

into the importance of information processing capacity in the ability of corporations to
effectively control performance at the level of their business units. Based on the propositions in
this dissertation, corporations can increase their control capabilities through increasing the level
of expertise in their headquarters, or increasing the number of staff that form the headquarters.
However, this dissertation acknowledges that its findings may be more relevant to unrelated
diversified corporations than to those that are related diversified.
Another contribution in this dissertation for practice is the significance of the role of “fit”
between a firm’s corporate controls and business unit strategy in the performance of its business
units. The implication of the propositions in this dissertation might discourage corporations with
tight financial control from engaging in the acquisition of businesses in industries where
exploration is vital to their performance, or in businesses that are considered to be the product
leaders in their relative product markets. This dissertation suggests that the misfit between
corporate controls and business strategies in such cases could negatively affect the performance
of the business unit. However, this research also contributes to a better understanding of the
importance of strategic controls to the successful performance of business units. My findings
show that while the fit between controls and strategy is most critical for achieving financial
performance in business units that pursue product leadership, strategic controls play a more
prominent role than financial controls in achieving higher financial or market share performance
for all business units.
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CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

Since 1962, when Gort presented the earliest measure for diversification, many attempts
have been made by scholars to investigate the significance of the effect of diversification on the
performance of business units. Up until 1974, when Rumelt presented a categorical approach to
distinguish between various types of diversification, the measures lacked the necessary richness
that would account for differences in the diversification approach pursued by corporations. An
example of this shortcoming would be corporate strategy. To respond to the question of whether
corporate strategy does or does not matter, past research has witnessed an evolution in the
research methodologies employed. At the same time, we have continued to witness conflicting
findings by researchers. This has resulted in the significance of corporate strategy in business
performance remaining ambiguous.
While methodological techniques in the measurement of corporate strategy have evolved,
little focus has been put on the conceptualization of the relationship between corporate strategy
and business unit strategy. Interestingly, the role of corporate controls that connect the business
units to their corporate parents has been very little investigated. Consequently, only the role of
corporate effects as a homogeneous influence on business unit performance has been studied.
This dissertation has aimed to take a more curious look into corporate effects, unpacking
the construct in order to understand the role of corporate controls and respond to the research
question, “How does corporate strategy influence business unit performance?”
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In order to respond to the aforementioned question, this dissertation has revisited the
theoretical foundations that underlie the corporate controls literature. Most notably, it has drawn
from the literature on agency theory to re-conceptualize corporate controls and theorize it into a
model that relates corporate strategy to business unit strategy in corporations.
The theoretical arguments in this dissertation provide several sets of hypotheses. The first
set of hypotheses establishes the link between corporate strategy and business unit strategy. To
formulate these hypotheses, the economic logic for value creation in each type of corporate
strategy has been built on. Also, the notion of bounded rationality, resulting from limitations in
information processing capacity, has been used to hypothesize the moderating effects on the
previously hypothesized relationships.
The second set of hypotheses establishes the link between controls and business unit
strategy, built on the foundations of agency theory, information processing theory, and the upper
echelons perspective. The arguments preceding these hypotheses, assuming the role of the
business unit CEO as the responsible individual for determining the business unit strategic
orientation, suggest that CEOs tend to pursue the business strategy that conforms best to the
controls mechanisms put in place by their corporate parent.
Finally, this dissertation concludes with hypotheses that examine the requirement of “fit”
between business strategy and corporate controls in order for the business unit to demonstrate the
desirable performance. Once again, drawing on the existing literature on controls, it has been
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suggested that conflict between strategic orientation and corporate controls could result in
business units’ underperforming.
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